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FITTING AN OLD TIGER WITH NEW 
TEETH: PROTECTING PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE FUNDS INVESTING IN 
COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
RICHARD E. MENDALES* 
 State employee benefit funds invested heavily in complex financial 
instruments before the crash of 2008.  These investments were tempting to 
the funds because the instruments carried higher yields than those offered 
by traditional securities in the low interest climate created largely by 
Federal Reserve policies after the turn of the century.  The risks of the 
unconventional securities were concealed by investment-grade ratings 
issued by credit rating agencies and by deceptive marketing practices.  
With the crash, funds incurred major losses, which, unlike losses by 
private funds, are not insured by the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation.   
 This Article deals both with enforcing claims based on deceptive 
practices, and protecting funds against future investments of this kind.  
Enforcement is an issue because the SEC has limited resources, though it 
faces fewer procedural burdens than the states, and is the only party with 
standing to bring actions under statutes such as the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940.  Enforcement by states acting alone is problematic because 
most states have limited experience in securities litigation, and because 
they may proceed under state law, risking divergent outcomes that could 
undermine the consistency in dealing with securities fraud intended by the 
federal securities laws.   
 This Article proposes that the SEC create within itself an Office of 
State Coordination to help train state legal personnel in securities fraud 
actions, and to enable the SEC to coordinate enforcement with state 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law.  Supreme Court Fellow, 1999–
2000.  J.D., Yale Law School, 1981; M.A., University of Chicago, 1970; B.A., University of 
Chicago, 1969.  I would like to thank my friends and colleagues at the Charleston School of 
Law and elsewhere for their patience and suggestions concerning drafts of this Article.  All 
errors, of course, are my own. 
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agencies in order to maximize the effectiveness of limited enforcement 
resources.  Next, it discusses protecting benefit funds in future investments 
and analyzes the provisions of the new Dodd-Frank Act intended to 
improve the securities rating process, finding them to be largely 
ineffective.  It therefore recommends largely bypassing Dodd-Frank, and 
giving earlier securities laws new teeth through regulatory changes 
restricting the sale of unregistered securities to larger, more sophisticated 
funds.  It also recommends extending the SEC’s “Plain English” 
disclosure rules—now applicable only to registered securities—to all 
securities offerings.  These rules require issuers to disclose the risks of the 
instruments they offer in plain English and in order of the magnitude of 
the risks they pose.  Thus, these rules would provide better guides to risk 
than the rating system, even as modified by Dodd-Frank, and will aid 
states both in regulating investments by their funds and in enforcement 
actions against deceptive practices.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The financial panic that began almost invisibly late in 2006 spread, 
like an epidemic, from largely unregulated organizations such as hedge 
funds to supposedly regulated institutions such as securities dealers and 
banks.1  It has now reached beyond that circle to strike at sovereign 
nations and, within the United States, at institutions deeply embedded 
in the fabric of society such as public employee benefit funds.2  Benefit 
funds face a continuing threat similar in nature to that already 
experienced by other financial institutions on Wall Street.  During the 
years preceding the crisis, the entities administering the benefit funds 
invested heavily in complex financial instruments that they did not 
understand, and which, when the crisis hit, proved to be worth far less 
than their cost, or proved to be impossible to value and therefore 
impossible to sell.3  
Public benefit funds are also threatened because the states and 
municipal entities that sponsor them have not made adequate 
contributions to support their future obligations.4  This is chiefly a 
 
1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE 
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION passim (2009); James R. Barth et al., The Financial Crisis: How 
Did We Get Here and Where Do We Go Next?, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 95, 97–98, 100 (Robert W. Kolb 
ed., 2010) (noting that the wave of foreclosures that ended the subprime housing boom began 
in 2006).  Judge Richard A. Posner, writing in 2009, described the worldwide financial crisis 
that climaxed in 2008 with the crash of global financial markets following the failure of the 
noted investment banking firms of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers as having sufficient 
magnitude to be described as a “depression” without parallel since the Crash of 1929 and the 
Great Depression that followed.  See POSNER supra. 
2. The term “benefit fund” will be used generically for purposes of this Article to cover 
trust funds established by states and their instrumentalities, including municipalities, school 
boards, and similar entities, for the welfare of their employees.  These include old age and 
disability pensions, medical benefit plans, and other similar funds. 
3. See Gretchen Morgenson, Wall Street’s Tax on Main Street, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, 
at BU1 (municipalities and benefit funds face financial ruin not only because of benefit 
obligations and weak revenues, but because of investment in financial instruments they do 
not understand and whose downside is not adequately disclosed to them); Louise Story, A 
Question of Value: What’s an Asset Worth? It’s Not Always Easy to Tell, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
2008, at C1 (outlining that “one of most vexing problems” facing Wall Street, even before the 
crash of 2008, was how to value securities backed by subprime mortgages). 
4. See Meredith Whitney, Opinion, The Hidden State Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., May 
18, 2011, at A17; David Evans, Banks Sell ‘Toxic Waste’ CDOs to Calpers, Texas Teachers 
Fund, BLOOMBERG (June 1, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aW5vEJn3LpVw; see also Morgenson, supra note 3 (discussing the recent bankruptcy 
filing by Central Falls, Rhode Island). 
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political problem, although it is linked to the securities law issues that 
are the primary subject of this Article, because the fund administrators 
are under intense pressure from beneficiaries and political officials to 
make up for insufficient contributions.  As a result, the administrators 
have made improvident investments to obtain unrealistically high yields 
on their assets.5  Most public pension funds, for example, still base 
required employee contributions and promised benefits on assumed 
returns of 7% to 8%, while actual yields have been 5% to 7% since the 
turn of the century, and less since the crash of 2008.6  During the period 
preceding the crash, fiduciaries for plans invested in securities based on 
high ratings and promises by issuers that the securities they were buying 
offered safety as well as high yields.7  Given the broad distinction 
between the political problems involved in funding public benefit funds,8 
and the threats they face from defaults of allegedly safe instruments, this 
Article will focus primarily on the latter, dealing with issues arising 
under the securities laws. 
Public benefit funds face problems that differ significantly from 
those faced by their private counterparts.  One important distinction is 
that qualifying private benefit funds are regulated by the Federal 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC),9 which ultimately 
provides at least partial compensation to its beneficiaries, should they 
prove insolvent.10  The federal Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act11 (ERISA) and the regulations adopted thereunder have given these 
 
5. See infra Part II.B.  
6. See infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 85, 97–103 and accompanying text. 
8. See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan & John Eligon, In Albany, Plan to Cut Pensions Takes 
Shape; Redistricting Moves Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, at A26 (discussing the bitter 
political battle over modifications in public pension contributions and benefits).  Benefit 
funds face strong opposition to modifications in required contributions, benefits, and other 
changes concerning their beneficiaries by the beneficiaries themselves and their 
representatives such as public employee unions and allied political forces.  See id. 
9. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 4002, 88 
Stat. 829, 1004 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1302 (2006)).  The PBGC was 
established by ERISA in 1974.  See id.  
10. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (2006).  
11. § 4002, 88 Stat. at 1004.  ERISA covers both qualifying private pension and health 
benefit plans, and mandates supervision of funding and investments for such plans, inter alia, 
by the Federal Department of Labor, the Internal Revenue Service, and the PBGC.  See 
History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/history.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
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funds substantial protection from abuses by financial intermediaries 
peddling risky financial instruments, although this protection has not 
been perfect.12 
Ironically, benefit funds operated by states and their subdivisions 
are at greater risk.  They are largely exempt from investment standards 
mandated by ERISA and PBGC insurance,13 and they were afforded 
minimal protection from federal statutes and regulations until the 
enactment, after the financial crisis had already taken its toll, of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act).14  It is not surprising, therefore, that problems are coming to 
light concerning the value of securities held by this large class of benefit 
funds,15 which present state governments with the risk of defaulting on 
securities they hold, in addition to underfunding based on loss of state 
revenues due to the continuing national financial crisis.16  Because major 
insolvencies at the state level could adversely impact the credit of the 
country as a whole,17 large-scale insolvency of state and local benefit 
 
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).  The sharp distinction between ERISA-based claims and 
those brought by public benefit funds is illustrated by the separate settlement by public 
benefit funds in the Stipulation of Settlement of Securities Action from Ohio Public 
Employees Retirement System v. Freddie Mac, MDL No. 1584, No. 03-CV-4261 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 23, 2006) (public benefit funds agreed to settlement of securities class action, stipulating 
it did not apply to related ERISA class action cases because the actions by public benefit 
funds relied solely on the securities laws, because they were not subject to protective 
provisions of ERISA). 
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1). 
14. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
15. See 2008 State & Local Public-Employee Retirement Systems, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(May 15, 2012), http://www.census.gov/govs/retire/historical_data_2008.html.  U.S. Census 
data show that there were about 2,550 state and local benefit funds holding about $2.2 trillion 
in total assets—about one-third of all assets held in U.S. benefit funds—as of June 30, 2008, 
just before the financial crisis reached its peak.  Rules of Registration of Municipal Advisers, 
Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 34-63576, 76 Fed. Reg. 824, 826 (proposed Jan. 6, 2011) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249). 
16. See infra note 64–66 and accompanying note. 
17. Contagion from the failure of major financial entities often has effects that can 
spread throughout a national economy or even the rest of the world, particularly when the 
national or world economy is already in fragile condition.  The failure of Lehman Brothers 
was such an event and helped precipitate the worldwide financial crisis of 2008.  See infra 
notes 207, 214–21 and accompanying text.  Another example is the threatened default of 
Greece, which, despite the relatively small size of the Greek economy, threatens to cause a 
chain reaction to larger economies such as Spain and Italy, and thence to the entire Eurozone 
and from there to countries outside the Eurozone.  See Rachel Donadio & Liz Alderman, 
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funds could lead to a financial meltdown comparable to the threatened 
failure of private financial institutions that brought on the 2008 crisis, 
and hence could require federal intervention despite the lack of formal 
insurance coverage by ERISA and PBGC under present law.18 
During the decade leading to the present financial crisis, benefit 
funds tremendously increased their exposure to risky investments, 
particularly in the form of complex asset-backed securities.19  The funds 
that proved vulnerable to the peddling of these financial instruments—
often deceptively marketed as offering safety in addition to high yield—
include not only smaller and less sophisticated funds20 but also large and 
supposedly sophisticated funds such as the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System21 (CALPERS) and the Teacher Retirement System 
of Texas.22  These funds experienced pressure from their beneficiaries 
and political officials to obtain higher rates of return on their 
investments,23 at a time when the prevailing low interest rates depressed 
yields on conventional investments to levels that made it more difficult 
 
Talks Under Way to Form a Government in Greece, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2012, at A8; 
Eurozone Crisis Explained, BBC NEWS: BUS. (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/bus
iness-13798000.  This is not a new phenomenon; the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, for 
example, with its direct effects on the national economy and indirect effects on insurance 
companies worldwide, helped precipitate the Panic of 1907 and resulting global financial 
crisis.  See ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS LEARNED 
FROM THE MARKET’S PERFECT STORM 13 (2007). 
18. See Whitney, supra note 4 (noting that state budget shortfalls, including partly 
hidden underfunding of pension and other employee obligations, could threaten the national 
recovery, since state spending makes up 12% of the United States’ gross domestic product). 
19. See Rules of Registration of Municipal Advisers, 76 Fed. Reg. at 825–26; Christopher 
Whalen, Yield to Commission: Is an OTC Market to Blame for Growing Systemic Risk?, J. 
STRUCTURED FIN., Summer 2008, at 8, 8; Evans, supra note 4. 
20. See, e.g., SEC Hearing on the State of Municipal Securities Market, Birmingham, AL 
(2011) (prepared remarks of Andrew Kalotay), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/muni
cipalsecurities/statements072911/kalotay.pdf. 
21. See, e.g., Michael B. Marois, Calpers Strips LaSalle of Industrial Real Estate 
Portfolio, Adds GI, RREEF, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2
010-12-01/calpers-strips-lasalle-of-industrial-real-estate-portfolio-job.html (noting that the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System is the largest state-run public employees’ 
pension fund in the United States). 
22. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 4.  
23. See Yes, They Can Go Down Too, ECONOMIST (May 13, 2007, 10:35 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2007/03/yes_they_can_go_down_too (noting 
that the Dallas Police and Fire Pension Funds bought high-risk CDOs to boost rates of 
return). 
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to fund potential claims for pension, and other, benefits.24 
The turkeys are now coming home to roost for benefit funds that 
bought risky instruments that have defaulted or sharply diminished in 
value.25  Faced with steep losses, some have commenced lawsuits against 
the financial advisers and institutions that sold and rated the risky 
investments.26  Both the transactions leading to these cases and the 
process of resolving them lead back to major holes in the federal 
statutes and regulations that supposedly protect investors against 
misrepresentations and manipulative conduct in the sale of securities.27  
One of these deficiencies, the exclusion of public funds from ERISA 
coverage, would require significant new federal legislation to 
overcome.28  Given the issues of federalism that this would raise, and the 
present highly partisan political climate—which seems likely to persist 
into the indefinite future—the burden of overcoming resistance to such 
legislation appears insuperable as of this writing.29 
 
24. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 4 (noting that the problems with pension funds are 
similar to Orange County’s 1994 bankruptcy at which time“[t]he county was earning 8 percent 
in what was a 3 1/2 percent world”).  
25. See John Ryan, The Greenspan and Bernanke Federal in the Reserve Roles in the 
Financial Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 461, 461–62 (noting that interest rates set by the 
Federal Reserve help dictate interest rates across the entire economy, and in particular led to 
low mortgage interest rates that fed the housing bubble). 
26. See Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 814 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(suit by pension fund against financial adviser seeking $1.2 billion after default of CDOs sold 
to pension system); Complaint, Illinois v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. 12 CH-02535 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
Jan. 25, 2012) (suit by State of Illinois against Standard & Poor’s seeking compensation for 
deceptive practices in rating asset-backed securities). 
27. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
28. ERISA specifically excludes “governmental plans” from coverage.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1003(b)(1) (2006).  Government plans include plans for federal employees and those of 
state governments, agencies, and instrumentalities, as well as those of international 
organizations, and Indian tribes.  Id. § 1002(32).  This is in part because the stated purpose of 
ERISA is to protect employees covered by private benefit plans from abuses, Id. § 1001(a)–
(c), and in part because Congress based its authority to enact ERISA in part on the taxing 
power, id. § 1001(c), a power that raises questions of federalism when applied to the states, as 
seen in the exemption of interest on the obligations of states and their instrumentalities from 
taxation.  See 26 U.S.C. § 115(1) (2006).  In any event, the extension of federal authority to 
states and their instrumentalities appears to be particularly difficult at this time, when any 
extension of federal authority faces steep roadblocks in Congress, and possibly in the courts 
as well.  See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 
713–15 (1999) (holding that states retain sovereignty where not limited by Constitutional 
authority of the federal government). 
29. See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN 
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This Article therefore suggests that new rules dealing with securities 
sold to public benefit funds—both for sales before the financial crisis 
and for protection against new abuses in the post-crisis world—should 
focus upon the peddlers of complex financial instruments rather than on 
the benefit funds they have victimized.  To provide a unified federal 
structure of protection, this approach necessarily will rely largely on 
regulations based on the securities laws.  As we shall see, the Dodd-
Frank Act, and regulations being drafted to implement Dodd-Frank,30 
will not suffice for this purpose.31 
These measures are inadequate for several reasons.  First, Dodd-
Frank is so large, complex, and riddled with legislative compromises32 
that the agencies charged with enforcing it, which have been 
systematically underfunded by Congress, have had to delay their 
drafting of interpretive regulations well beyond the deadlines set by the 
statute.33  Moreover, Dodd-Frank continues to face legislative hostility 
 
IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW 
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012).  The new study concludes that the Republican Party in 
Congress has been taken over by ideological extremists determined and able to obstruct any 
measure—especially regulatory actions—contrary to their anti-government philosophy.  Id. at 
XIV.  The book’s claims to non-partisanship are supported by Ornstein’s membership in the 
Republican-oriented American Enterprise Institute.  See Norman J. Ornstein: Resident 
Scholar, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, http://www.aei.org/scholar/norman-j-ornstein/ 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
30. See SEC’s Dodd-Frank Act Implementation Efforts Continue, FIN. SERVS. INST. 
(Oct. 20, 2010), https://www.financialservices.org/page.aspx?id=2886. 
31. See discussion infra Part IV.B–E. 
32. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lawmakers Seek Shortcut in Negotiating Housing Bill, 
WASH. POST, June 7, 2008, at D1 (detailing numerous comprises made by congress prior to 
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act); David Cho et al., Lawmakers Guide Wall Street Reform 
into Homestretch, WASH. POST, June 26, 2010, at A1. 
33. See Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for 2012: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. and Gen. Gov’t Appropriations of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 112th Cong. 109–17 (2011) (statement of Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. 
Securities & Exchange Commission); Arthur Levitt Jr., Op-Ed., Don’t Gut the S.E.C., N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at A19.  Full implementation of Dodd-Frank for FY 2012 required about 
780 new SEC staff, see id., and an increase in funding of $264 million from FY 2011, U.S. SEC. 
EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF: FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 2 (2011).  But the SEC 
received an increase of $178 million, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
74, 125 Stat. 786, 920 (2011) ($1.321 billion budget for FY 2012), $86 million short of the 
SEC’s $1.407 billion goal for FY 2012.  See U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra.  The Senate 
Appropriations Committee recently passed a $1.566 billion budget for the SEC in FY 2013, 
however, it is unclear whether this budget will be appropriated.  See Yin Wilczek, Ex-
Commissioners Say SEC Now Facing Biggest Rulemaking Crunch in Agency History, 44 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 28, at 1338 (July 9, 2012); Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. Senate Panel OKs 
 
12 - MENDALES FINAL PRINTER 12/28/2012  11:14 AM 
250 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:241 
 
that is likely to make agencies tread carefully in drafting regulations to 
implement it.34  In addition, it virtually excludes enforcement actions by 
parties other than regulatory agencies such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).35  This is a major weakness because, as is 
true for other actions by the SEC and other regulatory agencies, the 
number of professionals available for federal enforcement falls far short 
of the number required to deal with the securities law violations 
involved in the crisis.36  Although Dodd-Frank provides for the creation 
of an annual $100 million reserve fund for the SEC, financed by 
registration fees paid to the Commission,37 the House Appropriations 
Committee, displaying open hostility toward Dodd-Frank and the SEC 
itself, has sought to nullify the statute by both barring the creation of 
such a fund in bills making appropriations for the SEC, and by reducing 
its appropriations well below levels sought by the Executive Branch.38  
 
Budget Boosts for SEC, CFTC, REUTERS (June 14, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/201
2/06/14/us-senate-cftc-sec-funding-idUSBRE85D1HJ20120614; supra note 32; infra note 38, et 
seq. and accompanying text.  
34. See R. Christian Bruce, Wolin Defends Administration’s Efforts On Dodd-Frank, 
Vows to Oppose Repeal, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 17, at  868 (Apr. 25, 2011); Levitt, 
supra note 33 (noting that deliberate underfunding by Congressional Republicans has 
impaired the ability of agencies to draft regulations to enforce Dodd-Frank); Wilczek, supra 
note 33. 
35. See infra notes 282–83 and accompanying text. 
36. See Stephen J. Crimmins, New SEC Enforcement Unit Focuses on Funds and 
Advisers, 42 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 47, at 2284 (Dec. 6 2010) (noting that the SEC 
Enforcement Division has “limited resources,” and that the new unit to enforce Investment 
Advisers Act will comprise only 65 professionals, including both lawyers and accountants).  
As early as 1963, the SEC advised the Supreme Court in an amicus brief that it lacked 
sufficient personnel to carefully examine the 2,000 proxy statements submitted to it annually, 
a number that has multiplied many times since then.  See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 
432 (1964).  The lack of sufficient personnel not only prevents the agency (and other agencies 
involved in enforcement such as the CFTC) from bringing enforcement actions in many cases, 
but has forced the SEC to accept settlements that fail to bring about full disgorgement 
payments made in transactions violating the securities laws even if the accused wrongdoers, 
even if subject to injunctions for prior violations, are not required to admit wrongdoing.  See, 
e.g., Edward Wyatt, Judge Rejects an S.E.C. Deal with Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2011, 
at A1. 
37. See Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(i)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2011) (noting that the 
maximum amount that can be deposited per fiscal year is $50 million, while the maximum 
balance the account can hold is $100 million per fiscal year). 
38. See James Hamilton, House Financial Services Appropriations Bill Would Eliminate 
SEC Reserve Fund, CCH FIN. REFORM NEWS CTR. (June 16, 2011), http://financialreform.wo
lterskluwerlb.com/2011/06/house-financial-services-appropriations-bill-would-eliminate-sec-
reserve-fund.html.  The partisan hostility to the SEC was illustrated by the Committee’s 
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Congressional failure to fund the SEC at levels required by law has 
crippled the agency not only in its ability to recruit badly needed new 
personnel and to conduct enforcement actions, but even to engage in 
routine examinations, both at the national and at the local levels.39  
Other federal regulatory agencies, such as the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC),40 have also suffered Congressional 
cutbacks, but attacks on the SEC have special impact because the SEC 
has been the spearhead of federal enforcement of antifraud statutes and 
regulations.41 
Therefore, recovery of losses will require measures to enhance the 
effectiveness of the SEC as presently staffed, and to aid the states in 
acting on behalf of their benefit funds.  While some statutory changes of 
recent years, such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA),42 have created impediments to actions by parties other than 
 
statement, notwithstanding the creation of the fund by Dodd-Frank that would be “a slush 
fund for the SEC for programs that have not been approved by Congress.”  See House 
Appropriations Bill Funds SEC at $1.2B, $222M Less than Obama Request, 43 SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. (BNA) No. 25, at 1273 (June 20, 2011).  This hostility continues.  See Administration 
‘Strongly Opposes’ House Bill to Set SEC’s FY 2013 Budget at $1.371B, 44 SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. (BNA) No. 28, at 1334 (July 9, 2012) (noting that the House Appropriations Committee 
cleared H.R. 6020, setting 2013 appropriations for the SEC $195 million less than requested 
by the White House, and barring the SEC from using its $50 million reserve fund). 
39. See Stephen Joyce, Absence of Self-Funding Presents SEC with Big Challenge, 
Regional Chief Says, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 27, 2011); Stephen Joyce, Budget 
Deficiencies Leading to Change in SEC Examination Process, Canellos Says, SEC. L. DAILY 
(BNA) (Nov. 22, 2011) (short funding by Congress pushing the SEC to change its 
examination process “to focus on alleged wrongdoing at the expense of conducting more 
prudential exams”). 
40. See Charles Riley, Broken Budget Process Hurts Wall Street Reform, CNNMONEY 
(Feb. 10, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/10/news/economy/cftc_sec_budget/index.htm 
(noting that Congressional Republicans blocked higher appropriations for CFTC and SEC as 
part of their general opposition to implementing Dodd-Frank). 
41. SEC understaffing has long forced the agency to accept settlements with financial 
institutions accused of securities violations in which, even in cases of repeat violations, the 
targets of its actions have been able to avoid any admissions of specific acts of wrongdoing.  
See, e.g., Wyatt, supra note 36 (noting that a study by The New York Times showed fifty-one 
instances in which the SEC accepted settlements with companies that had previously agreed 
to injunctions not to commit similar infractions).  Settlements of this kind not only result in 
inadequate compensation of the victims of securities violations through agency action but also 
leave such victims with no court record on which to base their own actions against the 
offenders. 
42. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 and 78 (2006)) [hereinafter PSLRA]. 
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the SEC,43 the changes have had a penumbral effect beyond their actual 
language in deterring private counsel for benefit funds from undertaking 
actions in the federal courts,44 even though the funds are expressly 
exempt from the obstacles posed by the PSLRA,45 and its parallel 
statute, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA),46 
which enables defendants in private securities fraud class actions 
brought in state courts to remove them to federal court, where they can 
be dismissed without discovery under the PSLRA.47 
To overcome these problems, the SEC should act to keep securities 
regulation within a framework centered on federal securities law.  In 
view of the partisan deadlock that now besets Congress and is likely to 
 
43. The PSLRA was passed with the alleged intent to prevent abusive private class 
actions under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  See id.  It did so, inter 
alia, by raising the pleading requirements that plaintiffs must meet in order to obtain 
discovery from defendants.  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 
(2006) [hereinafter Exchange Act]; Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 
(2007). 
44. PSLRA, Sec. 101(a), § 27(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c) (2006); Andrew J. Entwistle & 
Jonathan H. Beemer, Approaches to Asset Recovery for Pension Fund Subprime Exposure, 
NAPPA REPORT, Feb. 2008, at 4, 4–6 (2008), available at http://www.entwistle-
law.com/news/publications/000041/_res/id=sa_File1/Approaches%20to%20Asset.pdf.  Part of 
this effect is probably due not only to the standards imposed for bringing actions, but to 
sanctions that the PSLRA imposes for allegedly abusive actions under the Exchange Act, 
which may have a deterrent effect on private attorneys representing benefit funds who are 
subject to the sanctions in bringing actions on behalf of private plaintiffs.  See Exchange Act 
§ 21D(c).  In fact, however, recent decisions indicate that the PSLRA is having adverse 
effects on actions by benefit funds—not intended targets of the statute—under the federal 
securities laws—and increasingly pushing them into state court.  See, e.g., Mississippi Pub. 
Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 523 F.3d 75, 78 (1st Cir. 2008) (reversing district 
court dismissal under PSLRA).  Even a large private entity such as AIG, in a securities-based 
action against two private investment firms, chose to bring the action under state law in New 
York even though it could have had its case heard in federal court based on facts pleaded in a 
parallel action by the SEC.  See Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. ICP Asset Mgmt., No. 10-cv-04791 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Complaint at 1–2, AIG Fin. Prods. v. ICP Asset Mgmt., No. 651117/2011 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011).  
45. See Exchange Act § 28(d); Securities Act of 1933 § 16(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(2) 
(2006). 
46. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb (2006)) [hereinafter SLUSA]. 
47. SLUSA, Sec. 101(a), § 16(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d) (2006).  SLUSA, like the PSLRA, 
applies only to private class actions, but it applies to all private class actions involving 
securities fraud, including not only actions under state securities law but even to actions based 
on causes of actions based on common-law fraud.  Id.; see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE 
LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 303 (6th ed. 2009). 
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continue into the foreseeable future,48 it seems unrealistic to propose 
new legislation at this writing.  Instead, the SEC and agencies 
coordinating with it, especially the CFTC, at the federal level, plus 
corresponding state attorneys general and securities officials—acting in 
support of funds sponsored by states and their instrumentalities—should 
draft regulations based on existing statutes, focusing in particular on 
enhanced federal–state cooperation.49 
This Article proposes changes based on revised federal regulations 
that will be more effective than reliance on poorly understood and 
enforced state laws that are increasingly employed by aggrieved benefit 
funds.50  These regulations will both aid benefit funds in recovering 
losses incurred as a result of fraudulent practices in the past, and serve 
to prevent similar abuses in the future.  The proposed reforms will, inter 
alia, provide for systematic cooperation between state and federal 
agencies in enforcing the rights of state benefit funds; reduce the scope 
of exemptions from registration of new securities under the Securities 
Act of 1933 (Securities Act);51 utilize the new tools provided by the 
Dodd-Frank Act where possible; and give new teeth to older federal 
securities law, including the long-underused Investment Advisers Act of 
1940 (Advisers Act).52 
To strengthen the enforcement of claims based on fraud, this Article 
proposes regulations based upon statutes enforceable only by the SEC, 
including the Advisers Act and certain provisions of the Securities Act 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).53  For new 
investments by benefit funds, this Article proposes regulations to be 
promulgated by the SEC under existing securities law, including the 
Advisers Act, and significant modifications of Rule 506 (promulgated 
 
48. See generally MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 29. 
49. See infra notes 308–11, 373–75 and accompanying text. 
50. See, e.g., Entwistle & Beemer, supra note 44, at 6.  The chief state law remedies are 
those for common law fraud, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, and state 
securities legislation, see id., increasingly including the Uniform Securities Act, 7C U.L.A. 749 
(1956), whose section 101 (section 501 in the Revised Unifrom Securities Act, id. at 150, 
which has not yet supplanted the original Uniform Securities Act in all states) antifraud 
provisions track Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 (although case law has yet to establish whether the 
remedies will be interpreted in the same way as federal courts apply Rule 10b-5).  17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5(c) (2011).  
51. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006). 
52. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-20 (2006). 
53. Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006). 
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pursuant to the Securities Act).54  These will require improved disclosure 
of risk factors in the issuance of financial instruments other than 
traditional corporate and government securities to public benefit funds; 
reduced dependence on ratings by credit rating agencies that, even after 
Dodd-Frank, remain lightly regulated;55 and increased aid to state 
regulators in establishing sound investment practices for the funds under 
their supervision.56  
As noted, regulatory changes to protect benefit funds should focus 
on improving coordination between the SEC and state regulators, by 
means such as expanding the SEC’s present role in providing training 
for lawyers in state attorney generals’ offices in bringing enforcement 
actions, and by employing state lawyers to assist thinly staffed SEC 
enforcement teams in maintaining actions that only the SEC itself has 
standing to bring.57  The SEC can also amend current regulations to 
protect benefit funds going forward by limiting the ability of smaller 
funds to buy privately placed securities and by applying the SEC’s 
“Plain English” disclosure rules to all securities disclosure, which 
includes private placement memos.58 
II.   EXOTIC SECURITIES IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 
The last thirty years have been marked by a proliferation of new 
types of securities, which steadily increased in complexity, risk, and 
difficulties in understanding the nature of the risk presented.59  The 
problem has been aggravated by the deregulation of the financial 
system,60 which created a climate of financial recklessness bringing to 
mind the “Gilded Age” of the late nineteenth century.61 
 
54. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2012).  
55. See infra notes 280–85, 334–49 and accompanying text. 
56. See infra notes 307, 348–51 and accompanying text. 
57. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
58. Since 1998, the SEC has required disclosure in any prospectus accompanying 
registered securities to be written in Plain English, making it clear to investors exactly what 
risks they face.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.420–.421.  See generally OFFICE INVESTOR EDUC. 
ASSISTANCE, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: HOW TO CREATE 
CLEAR SEC DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS (1998). 
59. See infra Part II.A. 
60. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 23–28 (noting that the deregulation of financial 
industry was a major contributor to the escalation of risk in assets leading to financial crisis); 
infra Part III.A. 
61. See generally 12 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, VORLESUNGEN ÜBER DIE 
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At the same time that the nature of the securities made them less 
comprehensible to potential purchasers and even the financial 
intermediaries peddling them, the low interest rates on conventional 
debt securities based on Federal Reserve policy since the turn of the 
century62 created an appetite for higher yields, particularly by 
underfunded benefit funds.63  Even a benefit fund receiving 
contributions at levels that previously sufficed to meet eventual 
beneficiary claims would face eventual underfunding if it followed old 
patterns of investing in well-understood and traditionally safe 
instruments such as government securities and corporate bonds.64  For 
many benefit funds, whose contribution rates fell well below the amount 
needed to fund promised benefits even if invested in traditional 
instruments, the potential deficits ran much higher—threatening cities 
and other state subdivisions with Chapter 9 bankruptcy,65 with ripple 
effects threatening the states themselves and the larger national 
 
PHILOSOPHIE DER WELTGESCHICHTE 8 (1831) (translated by author) (on file with author) 
(“Was die Erfahrung aber und die Geschichte lehren, ist dieses, daß Völker und die 
Regierungen niemals etwas aus der Geschichte lehren . . . haben,” very roughly translated, 
“The only thing we learn from history is that we never learn anything from history”); MARK 
TWAIN & CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER, THE GILDED AGE: A TALE OF TODAY (1873). 
62. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 122–29; see also E. Scott Reckard, Despite Paying 
Record Low Interest Rates, Banks are Awash in Deposits That They Don’t Want, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 18, 2011, at B1. 
63. See Kaplan & Eligon, supra note 8; see, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh & Danny Hakim, 
Public Pensions Faulted for Bets on Rosy Returns, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012, at A1 (noting 
that public pensions operate on estimated yield of 7% to 8% on invested contributions, 
though actual yields have fallen to 5% to 7% since 2000). 
64. See, e.g., Yes, They Can Go Down Too, supra note 23 (noting that Dallas Police and 
Fire Pension Funds bought high-risk CDOs to boost rates of return). 
65. See Walsh & Hakim, supra note 63.  Municipalities and other state instrumentalities 
(though not states themselves) may file for bankruptcy reorganization under 11 U.S.C. § 901.  
In the current crisis, Stockton, California filed for bankruptcy on June 28, 2012, Complaint at 
1, Ass’n Retired Emps. v. City of Stockton (In re City of Stockton), No. 12-32118-C-9, 2012 
WL 3193588 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. July 10, 2012), becoming the largest city to file under Chapter 
9 to date, see Stockton, Calif. Files for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, NBCNEWS.COM (June 28, 
2012), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/48006746/ns/business-us_business/#.T_MCjpFnU6w.  
Significantly, the largest single claim against Stockton is by CALPERS for $147.5 million in 
unfunded pension liabilities.  Stockton, Calif. Files for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, supra.  The 
Association of Retired Employees of the City of Stockton initiated a class action against the 
City of Stockton seeking a ruling ordering “the City to keep paying for their health benefits 
during th[e] chapter 9 case.”  Ass’n Retired Emps. v. City of Stockton (In re City of 
Stockton), No. 12-32118-C-9, 2012 WL 3193588, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2012).  The 
bankruptcy court dismissed the retiree’s claim.  Id. at *18–19. 
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economy.66 
A. The Onset of Complexity: Asset-Backed Securities 
Low yields on traditional securities helped fuel the growth of new 
types of securities, which offered higher yields at the cost of rapidly 
increasing complexity, volatility, and concealed risk.  These can be 
described generically as asset-backed securities, since all of them, from 
plain-vanilla mortgage-backed Fannie Mae67 securities to the most 
complex derivatives based on them, rest on assets—pooled debt 
instruments—that provide regular streams of payments. 
The forerunner of all of these securities was the residential 
mortgage-backed security (RMBS).68  Securities backed by pools of 
mortgages were sold in the U.S. at least as early as the 1880s, but were 
first issued in their modern form by the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) while it was still a government agency, in 
1966.69  Fannie Mae was split into two entities—the Government 
 
66. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.   
67. “Fannie Mae” is the nickname generally used for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, founded as a government agency in 1934 and privatized—but with a remaining 
link to the federal government that has proven costly to taxpayers—in 1968.  See Richard E. 
Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the 
CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1364–66. 
68. The SEC, in its proposed rulemaking concerning the Dodd-Frank provisions 
affecting rating agencies, has divided asset-backed securities into the RMBS, commercial 
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), commercial loan obligations (CLOs), asset-backed 
commercial paper conduits (ABCP), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs—covering 
asset-backed securities including miscellaneous collateral, including other asset-backed 
securities).  See Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-64514, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,420, 33,436 n.152–56 (proposed June 8, 2011) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 & 249).  For purposes of this Article, asset-backed 
securities backed by mortgages will be referred to generically as “collateralized mortgage 
obligations” (CMOs), as they were when they reemerged on the financial scene in the late 
1970s. 
69. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1365.  Actually, what may have been the earliest 
form of mortgage-backed security, the Pfandbrief (plural “Pfandbriefe”—German nouns are 
always capitalized), was introduced by Frederick the Great of Prussia as early as 1769 to help 
pay the ruinous costs of the Seven Years’ War, and has received a new lease on life during the 
past few years in the form of “covered bonds” being issued not only in other civil law 
countries but in the United States as well.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Conundrum of 
Covered Bonds, 66 BUS. LAW. 561, 563–64 (2011); Stefan Kofner, The German Pfandbrief 
System Facing the Financial Crisis, Prepared for the European Network of Housing 
Research: International Housing Conference, Prague, Czech Republic, June 28–July 1, 2009, 
available athttp://www.soc.cas.cz/download/808/paper_Kofner_01.pdf.  Pfandbriefe continue 
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National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), which remained a 
government agency70—and the present Fannie Mae, which was largely 
privatized (but continued to buy mortgages for securitization) in 1968.71  
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Freddie Mac) was created 
in 1970 as a publicly held corporation, also for the primary purpose of 
enhancing the market for buying, selling, and securitizing mortgages.72  
Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are privately held, the fact that 
their securities were exempt from SEC registration, and that they held 
their charters and emergency lines of credit from the federal 
government, led participants in the secondary mortgage markets to 
believe—before the financial crisis—that they enjoyed implicit 
guaranties from the federal government.73  They are therefore 
commonly called “government-sponsored enterprises” (GSEs).74 
Beginning about 1977, investment banks began to follow the GSEs 
in buying pools of mortgages and issuing “private label” CMOs that 
passed through proportionate shares of principal and interest from the 
underlying mortgages to purchasers.75  In a basic CMO, a mortgage 
 
to flourish in Germany, regulated by the Pfandbriefgesetz, a statute that has been continually 
modernized (most recently in 2009), and their analogues have become popular in other civil 
law countries.  Pfandbriefgesetz, PfandBG [Pfandbrief Act], 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL] 
at Teil I, §§ 1373–93, as amended by Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung des Pfandbriefrechts 
vom Marz 2009 (Ger.), available at http://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/0/B4DE7DF10
6F794A8C12579A70030C6E5/$FILE/PfandBG_BGBl_2005_I_13731393.pdf?OpenElement.  
Because Pfandbrief are regulated by law that ensures their backing by high-quality collateral, 
they are safer than their CMO cousins and have weathered the 
present economic storm far better.  See Advantages of Pfandbriefe, VERBAND DEUTSCHER 
PFANDBRIEFBANKEN, http://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/tindex/en_141.htm (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2012).  Despite the new vogue for “covered bonds,” which employ structural 
elements borrowed from the Pfandbriefgesetz, American law does not provide the kind of 
regulation that gives Pfandbriefe their reliability.  In fact, fairly drastic changes in U.S. law 
such as statutorily mandated certification and monitoring of issuers and their collateral would 
be required to establish a similar level of safety.  See, e.g., Pfandbriefgesetz, Teil I, §§ 1373–93. 
70. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1365–66. 
71. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 536 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (2006)). 
72. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450, 450 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1452 (2006)) (creating an act “[t]o increase the availability of 
mortgage credit for the financing of urgently needed housing, and for other purposes”).  
73. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1366–67. 
74. See, e.g., THE BOND MARKET ASSOCIATION, AN INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO PASS-
THROUGH AND COLLATERALIZED MORTGAGE SECURITIES 2 (2002), available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/mbs/docs/about_MBS.pdf; Mendales, supra note 67, at 1366. 
75. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1367. 
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originator (originally a bank or thrift institution, but, as the 1990s wore 
on, increasingly a nontraditional and largely unregulated lender)76 sells 
mortgage instruments to an investment bank, which pools mortgages 
thus obtained and transfers them to an entity legally known as a “special 
purpose vehicle” (SPV).77  The SPV then sells securities representing 
fractional shares of the pool to investors.78  The investors receive 
proportionate shares of the total payments of interest and principal by 
mortgagors on the instruments held in the pool.79  The advantages to an 
investor in buying a mortgage-backed security include the purported 
safety of mortgages as collateral, diversification of risk by using 
mortgages from different geographic areas in each pool;80 and, crucial 
for yield-starved benefit funds, interest rates that were higher than those 
on similarly rated corporate debt obligations.81 
 
76. Nontraditional mortgage companies were loosely and inconsistently regulated by the 
states rather than the federal government, which regulated FDIC-insured banks and thrifts.  
See Martin N. Baily et al., The Origins of the Financial Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, 
at 79, 82.  The increasing origination of mortgages by these poorly regulated entities, with the 
intent to sell them for securitization rather than to keep on the originators’ balance sheets, 
was a factor in the deterioration of mortgage collateral that contributed to the financial crisis.  
See id. at  79–82. 
77. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(iv)(B)(1) (2012) (providing a formal defintion of SPV).  
SPVs are also, less formally, referred to in finance as “special purpose entities” (SPEs).  See 
Stephen Bryan et al., Curbing Optimism in Managerial Estimates Through Transparent 
Accounting, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR 
ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 361, 361–62. 
78. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1367. 
79. See id. at 1364–67.  SPVs have also been used for shady accounting purposes such as 
removing questionable items from corporate balance sheets in cases such as Enron.  See 
Enron Aside, Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) Are Legal, Innovative and Widely Used, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 17, 2006), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?
articleid=1483.  
80. The apparent safety of diversification may be illusory, since the diversification of an 
asset portfolio becomes meaningless “if it is duplicated by enough people.”  John E. 
Martinsen, Four Paradoxes of the 2008–2009 Economic and Financial Crisis, in LESSONS 
FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, 
supra note 1, at 59, 65. 
81. See John D. Martin, A Primer on the Role of Securitization in the Credit Market 
Crisis of 2007, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 199, 202.  In fact, however, well before the 
financial crisis precipitated by the bursting of the housing bubble in 2007–2008, it became 
clear that the risk associated with investment-grade corporate debt was significantly less than 
that associated with mortgage-backed securities given similar ratings.  See infra notes 121, 130 
and accompanying text. 
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 Safety, at least as measured by ratings issued by the three leading 
credit rating agencies (SEC-accredited rating agencies are officially 
known as “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations,” or 
“NRSROs”),82 was vital for CMOs.  This was not only a practical sales 
point, but a legal necessity, because ratings were the key to special 
treatment under the securities laws based on the 1984 Secondary 
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act (SMMEA).83  Under SMMEA, 
CMO instruments with face amounts above $250,000 and rated in the 
top two grades of at least one rating agency accredited by the SEC did 
not have to be registered under the Securities Act.84  The pliant SEC of 
the time established by regulation85 that SPVs and CMOs would not 
have to apply to the agency for letter rulings establishing that they did 
not have to register under the Investment Company Act of 1940,86 but 
would be considered automatically exempt from regulation. 
Apart from SMMEA’s effect on private label securities, it also 
authorized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to deal in subordinate lien 
mortgages,87 making their securities riskier—especially in the absence of 
effective accounting controls.88  This, along with the deterioration in 
 
82. See Exchange Act § 15E, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006).  Throughout the period in 
question, ratings were issued by an oligopoly consisting of three credit rating agencies 
recognized by the SEC:  Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and a lesser player, Fitch.  See Frank 
Partnoy, The Siskel & Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating 
Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 648 n.137 (1999). 
83. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, § 101, 98 
Stat. 1689 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
84. Id. § 106. 
85. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (2011).  As the financial crisis gathered momentum in July, 
2008, the SEC, while admitting that it originated the term “NRSRO” in its rules in 1975, 
claimed that its use of ratings was “for a narrow purpose,” though admitting that ratings had 
become widely used in state, federal, and even international regulations, and attempted, far 
too late, to reduce regulatory dependence on ratings by the major rating agencies.  See 
References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Dodd-
Frank Act Release No. 34-58070, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,088 (proposed July 11, 2008) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 & 249).  The proposed rule changes to reduce reliance on ratings 
were abandoned in 2009, and replaced by new regulations, including some mandated by the 
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.  See Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64514, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,420, 33,420 & n.3  
(proposed June 8, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 & 249). 
86. See Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2006)). 
87. See § 203(a), 98 Stat. at 1693. 
88. The GSEs’ freedom from SEC registration fostered weak internal accounting 
controls which led to a major accounting scandal before the GSEs were actually placed in 
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standards for even first-lien mortgages purchased and securitized by the 
GSEs, contributed to the unperceived increase in risk in their 
securities—and, based on their inventories of these securities—to their 
own insolvency when the crisis of 2007–2008 struck.89 
The dependence on ratings was not confined to the U.S.  The 
discovery that ratings did not accurately predict risk for structured 
instruments helped make the 2008 financial crisis worldwide because 
instruments purchased based on strong ratings became embedded in the 
capital of financial institutions around the world.90  Even the Basel 
Committee on Bank Supervision made ratings the basis for its proposals 
on the quality of reserve capital required for major international banks.91 
CMOs, however, were just the first step in creating a new financial 
category that became known as “structured finance.”  During the 1980s, 
CMOs became a subclass of a broader class of securities generally 
known as “collateralized debt obligations” (CDOs).92  CDOs based their 
cash flow on debt instruments extending beyond the conventional 
residential mortgages93 used to back the original CMOs, to include 
significantly riskier obligations, including non-conventional mortgages, 
 
receivership.  See Kathleen Day, Study Finds ‘Extensive’ Fraud at Fannie Mae: Bonuses 
Allegedly Drove the Scheme, WASH. POST, May 24, 2006, at A1.  A study by the SEC and the 
Office of Federal Housing Oversight (a title with a double meaning) released in 2006 showed 
that Fannie Mae alone “misstat[ed] earnings by about $10.6 billion from 1998 through 2004.”  
Id. 
89.  See, e.g., Bloomberg, America’s Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac Tumble on ‘Insolvency’ 
Fears, TELEGRAPH (July 10, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2793000/Americas-
Fannie-Mae-and-Freddie-Mac-tumble-on-insolvency-fears.html (noting that GSEs feared 
insolvency based on fair value accounting because of their large borrowing to purchase 
mortgage-backed securities for their inventories). 
90. See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. at 40,088; POSNER, supra note 1, at 55 (noting that worldwide 
distribution of U.S. mortgage-backed securities helped “globalize” what might have been a 
purely U.S. crisis).  
91. See MICHAEL B. GORDY, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS., MODEL 
FOUNDATIONS FOR THE SUPERVISORY FORMULA APPROACH 1 (2004). 
92. See Peter Cohan, Behind the $4 Trillion in CDOs: Sneaky Banks and Worthless 
Ratings, DAILY FIN. (Apr. 26, 2010, 10:45 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/04/26/expl
aining-the-4-trillion-cdo-scam-worthless-ratings-hide-inve/. 
93. “Conventional mortgages” are mortgages which, though not insured by the Federal 
Housing Authority, meet the statutory standards set for mortgages that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac are allowed to purchase.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (9th ed. 2009).  
Under Freddie Mac’s statutory charter, these must “meet generally the purchase standards 
imposed by private institutional mortgage investors.”  12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(1) (2006). 
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commercial mortgages,94 and other, still less secure debt including car 
loans, student loans, unsecured obligations such as commercial paper, 
credit card debt, other CDOs,95 and even derivatives not directly based 
on collateral pools backing particular CDOs.96  CDO collateral pools 
included other asset-backed securities whose safety was assessed based 
on the less than reliable standards set by credit rating agencies97—
although mortgages remained the most important instruments 
underlying CDOs in terms of aggregate value.98 
CDOs were supposed to be safe because the safety of at least the 
highest-rated tranches of a CDO pool,99 as with CMOs, was one of their 
chief selling points.100  This presumed safety, which both buyers and 
regulators imprudently inferred from high ratings given to instruments 
 
94. See infra note 102 and accompanying text (discusssing the special risk characteristics 
of commercial mortgages). 
95. A CDO composed of tranches of other CDOs is known as a “CDO squared.”  See 
Whalen, supra note 19, at 8–9; CDO-Squared, FINANCIAL TIMES LEXICON, 
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=CDO_squared (last visited Sept. 13, 2012).  Securities of this 
kind were not registered and sold over the counter to accredited investors under SEC 
exemptions from registration.  Whalen, supra note 19, at 8–9.  Because of their opacity—a 
purchaser relied on the ratings of the CDO collateral rather than underlying assets—their sale 
benefited only their dealers and when general confidence in structured securities faltered, 
their market collapsed, leaving their purchasers with enormous losses.  See Whalen, supra 
note 19, at 8–9; CDO-Squared, supra. 
96. See Adrian A.R.J.M. van Rixtel & Sarai Criado, The Contribution of Structured 
Finance to the Financial Crisis: An Introductory Overview, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 239, 240; 
Whalen, supra note 19, at 8.  Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae underwriting standards were also 
initially used to assure favorable repayment characteristics for securitized mortgages.  See 
Problems in Mortgage Packaging: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gen. Oversight and 
Investigations of the Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urb. Aff., 99th Cong. 89–91 (1985) 
(statement of Laurence D. Fink, Managing Director, First Boston Corporation) [hereinafter 
Statement of Laurence D. Fink].  
97. See infra notes 114–24 and accompanying text (concerning rating standards). 
98. See Peter L. Swan, The Global Crisis and Its Origins, in LESSONS FROM THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, 
at 51, 51–56; infra notes 128–43 and accompanying text. 
99. See Complaint at 7, SEC v. Steffelin (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011) (No. 11-Civ.-4204) 
(CDO pools were divided into different “tranches” with higher and lower priority claims to 
the cash flows from the pools for the use of tranches to enhance the ratings given to the 
highest-priority tranches with interests in a single CDO pool).  
100. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-
Big-to-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 724 (2010) (noting that “[i]nvestors relied 
heavily on credit ratings” for complex instruments because their “complexity . . . made it 
difficult” for outsiders to determine the level of risk). 
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in each pool by the three leading credit rating agencies, was originally 
based on the presumed security of conventional mortgage lending 
standards,101 augmented by what were called “credit enhancements” to 
protect holders against prepayment of standard mortgages, and for less 
reliable collateral such as commercial mortgages102 and obligations not 
secured by mortgages.103 
The earliest credit enhancements were relatively straightforward.  
Some resembled the protective features of German Pfandbriefe, which, 
as noted above,104 were fairly effective in withstanding the financial crisis 
of 2007–2008.105  These features included: overcollateralization, including 
assets in a pool with nominal values greater than the value of securities 
sold based on interests in the pool; recourse—the requirement that 
sellers of mortgages into a pool retain at least part of their risk of 
default;106 backing by insurance-type arrangements, including standby 
letters of credit issued by banks to make good on defaulted collateral;107 
and insurance issued by monoline insurance carriers,108 such as 
 
101. Statement of Laurence D. Fink, supra note 96, at 90–92. 
102. Even early securitizers recognized that commercial mortgages had sharply different 
and less predictable risk characteristics than residential home mortgages.  See Secondary 
Market For Commercial Real Estate Loans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pol’y Res. and  
of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urb. Aff., 102nd Cong. 56 (1992) (statement of 
Michael L. O’Hanlon, Managing Director, Lehman Brothers); Marc Hochstein & Heather 
Timmons, Credit Drought Withering Specialty Finance Firms, AM. BANKER, Nov. 4, 1998, 
at 1. 
103. See Cohan, supra note 92.  
104. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
105. See Kofner, supra note 69, at 19.  
106. Over collateralization and retention of risk by mortgage originators are among the 
features that give Pfandbriefe their safety.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
Pfandbriefe, however, have additional safety factors such as statutory supervision that have 
never had a place in Wall Street CMOs.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
107. Standby letters of credit, unlike commercial letters of credit, require the issuing 
bank to pay a beneficiary only on default by banks customers purchasing the instruments, and 
thereby act as insurance.  See I. Walter Deitch, Fundamentals of Commercial and Standby 
Letters of Credit, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/fundam
entals-commercial-and-standby-letters-credit. 
108. Monoline insurers engage solely in insuring financial instruments.  Dwight Jaffee, 
Monoline Restrictions, with Applications to Mortgage Insurance and Title Insurance, 28 REV. 
INDUS. ORG. 83, 83 (2006).  They emerged in the 1970s, originally insuring municipal 
securities but soon extending their coverage to asset-backed securities.  See Dave Bradford & 
Johanny Cruz, Monoline Meltdown, INSIDER Q., Summer 2008, at 64; see also Monoline 
Insurance Companies, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/monolineinsura
nce.asp#axzz1ht1AiPzj (last visited Sept. 22, 2012).  Their specialization is a result of state 
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AMBAC.109  Each of these protective features carried with it expenses 
that raised the cost to issuers and underwriters, who sought to cut their 
costs by devising less expensive but unproven protective measures 
inherent in the structure of the asset-backed securities themselves.110 
B. Ratcheting Up Complexity: Derivatives Based on Asset-Backed 
Securities 
By the mid-1980s, the original forms of credit enhancement 
appeared too awkward and expensive to the investment banks that 
structured “private label” asset-backed securities.111  They therefore 
devised alternatives based on the structure of the securities themselves 
that were less expensive to issuers and more flexible in permitting the 
use of new types of collateral, bearing higher risk than traditional 
mortgages.112  Although the credit rating agencies continued to give 
many of the higher risk mortgages top ratings, the agencies did so by 
creating untested and undisclosed economic models for safety; the 
instruments that they gave high ratings, in fact carried significantly 
higher levels of risk than similarly rated conventional debt securities.113 
 
regulation forbidding traditional insurers from issuing such policies.  See Jaffee, supra, at 91 & 
n.15.  This absence of diversity in their risk portfolios makes them and their insurance 
products riskier than traditional insurers and their products. 
109. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEA, SECURITIZATION: A PRIMER ON STRUCTURES AND 
CREDIT ENHANCEMENT 8 (2006); Partnoy, supra note 82, at 671.  In the experience of the 
author of this Article at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom in New York during the early 
days of private label securitization in the 1980s, the first widely-used forms of credit 
enhancement were recourse, overcollateralization, insurance from monoline insurers, and 
standby letters of credit from banks.  Recourse posed a particular problem because the 
transfers of mortgages from originators to SPVs were intended to be true sales, making the 
SPVs remote from any hypothetical bankruptcy of the originator, while significant retention 
of risk by the issuer created the danger that a bankruptcy court would rule that an intended 
sale was merely a secured loan, so that the SPV would not be remote from a bankruptcy case 
involving the issuer. 
110. See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text. 
111. “Private label” asset-backed securities are those issued by financial institutions 
other than the so-called government sponsored entities (GSEs), including Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac (the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation), both of which created 
traditional-style CMOs.  See Mortgage-Backed Securities, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (July 23, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm.  Ginnie Mae, the Government 
National Mortgage Association, remains a government agency, and guaranties mortgages but 
does not assemble them into pools for slicing and dicing into mortgage-backed securities.  Id. 
112. See Cohan, supra note 92. 
113. See Wilmarth, supra note 100, at 724–25.  Although the chief focus on ratings has 
been on the inaccuracy of high ratings used in the initial sale of securities—especially complex 
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The credit rating agencies did so at least in part because of a new 
business model that created a major conflict of interest for them.  Prior 
to 1970, they were paid by subscribers—and even then their ratings, 
particularly for lower-rated securities, were criticized for unreliability.114  
During the 1970s, however, the agencies began to receive most of their 
income as fees paid by the issuers of securities that they rated.115  They 
made this change just at the time that their ratings became more central 
to the financial system because government agencies, starting, ironically, 
with the SEC, began to use them as a basis for judging the quality of 
securities used as reserves by securities dealers and other moneyed 
businesses.116  This augmented the agencies’ conflicts of interest by 
increasing pressure on them by issuers and underwriters to issue high 
ratings for the issuers’ securities.117 
In no context did this conflict manifest itself more strongly than in 
the issuance of asset-backed securities.118  While the agencies used the 
same letter ratings for these securities as for conventional corporate 
debt, the new securities had different default characteristics.119  The 
agencies did not test their methodologies to assure that a CDO rated 
AAA possessed the same degree of safety that such a rating would 
indicate for a conventional corporate bond.120  Studies done well before 
the 2008 crash showed that in fact CDOs given investment-grade ratings 
 
one-off asset-backed securities, a further problem is that the sensitivity of asset-backed 
securities to changes in the value of collateral requires ratings already issued to be frequently 
reviewed and, where appropriate, downgraded—and the rating agencies were notoriously 
slow to downgrade securities based on adverse information.  See The Role of Credit Rating 
Agencies in the Structured Finance Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., 
Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 114–15 (2007) 
(prepared statement of Joseph R. Mason, Associate Professor, Drexel University) 
[hereinafter Statement of Joseph R. Mason].  
114. See Partnoy, supra note 82, at 647, 652–53. 
115. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of 
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1679 (2008). 
116. See Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure: How Moody’s and Other Credit-Rating 
Agencies Licensed the Abuses That Created the Housing Bubble—and Bust, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Apr. 27, 2008, at 36, 39. 
117. See Partnoy, supra note 82, at 652–53. 
118. See Kettering, supra note 115, at 1681 (by 2006, Moody’s received over 45% of its 
rating revenues from ‘“structured finance’ transactions”). 
119. See Lowenstein, supra note 116, at 41.  
120. Id. (noting that prior to the failure of the CDO market in 2007, Moody’s rated 
CDOs based on models relying on the securities’ structure, using untested assumptions and 
without conducting due diligence concerning the quality of the underlying collateral). 
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failed at a much higher rate than conventional corporate debt.121 
The first technique used to obtain high ratings for asset-backed 
securities based on structure rather than external credit enhancement 
was to sell securities with different priority rights to streams of payments 
from a given pool of debt instruments.122  Investment bankers, rather 
than including an excess of collateral or obtaining external support such 
as insurance for obligations based on a pool of debt instruments, divided 
securities deriving payments of principal and interest from a given pool 
into “tranches”—often five or more based on a single pool of debt 
instruments.123  A first and sometimes a second tranche would have prior 
rights to payment over subsequent tranches on income from the same 
pool of debt instruments,124 and hence, would benefit from what was 
called the “waterfall” effect receiving the backing of greater assets than 
the nominal value of the tranche.125  This generally sufficed to persuade 
pliable credit rating agencies to give first (and sometimes second) 
tranches their top ratings for ability to pay interest and principal126—
ratings that should have been questionable not only because the 
agencies’ models were untested but were tainted by the rating agencies’ 
payment by the issuers of the CDOs they were rating.127 
 
121. See infra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
122. See Lowenstein, supra note 116, at 39–41. 
123. See, e.g., BOND MARKET ASSOCIATION, supra note 74, at 7. 
124. Priority gave senior tranches the right to receive payments of principal and interest 
from a pool of debt instruments to the full amount due the senior tranches on any date 
payment was due, before any payments could be made to junior tranches.  See, e.g., 
Complaint at 6–7, SEC v. Steffelin, (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011) (No. 11-Civ.-4204).  Priority 
could be sequential—based on earlier payment due senior tranches than for junior tranches (a 
significant factor, since one of the problems faced by holders of mortgage-backed securities 
consists of prepayments by mortgagors on their underlying debt)—or by contractual 
subordination of junior tranches.  See, e.g., id.  By analogy to the normal priority of 
distributions under corporate law, the most junior tranches with rights against any pool were 
often referred to as the “equity.”  See, e.g., id. (the “equity” tranches of a CDO are the most 
subordinate, generally unrated notes secured by a given pool of assets). 
125. See id. at 7.  
126. See, e.g., Realtek Indus. v. Nomura Sec., 939 F. Supp. 572, 576 (N.D. Ohio 1996) 
(noting that higher priority tranches had prior claims on cash flow from collateral pool, 
entitling senior tranches to higher ratings); see also supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
127. The rating agencies were also, unlike other participants in the creation of new 
securities, largely unregulated by the securities laws until the passage of the totally 
inadequate Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006)).  This statute attempted to address agency deficiencies by 
encouraging the creation of competing agencies, but actually forbade the SEC from 
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Despite the dubious character of the ratings, they became 
increasingly important to the buyers of asset-backed securities as the 
securities became more complex, since the ratings were the only 
generally accepted way to assess the ability of a new type of security to 
pay principal and interest.128  Even before the quality of collateral 
providing cash flows for CDOs began to decline in the late 1990s, 
however, it became clear that ratings for structured finance securities 
did not mean the same thing as the same ratings given to conventional 
corporate debt: an asset-backed security rated AAA was much more 
likely to default than a corporate bond with the same rating.129  During 
the period 1993–2005, well before subprime mortgages became the chief 
collateral backing CDOs, CDOs rated Baa by Moody’s (the lowest 
“investment grade” rating given by Moody’s) had ten times the default 
risk of conventional debt with the same rating.130 
The incommensurability of ratings between asset-backed securities 
and conventional investments was aggravated during the late 1980s with 
the creation of an additional level of complexity in structured securities 
that added derivative obligations to the mix.  Derivatives are financial 
instruments whose values are based on the values of other instruments, 
including securities and commodities.131  They are an ancient financial 
device that can be useful to plan for future swings in prices,132 originating 
with commodity futures, where users of commodities hedge against the 
risk that commodities they use routinely will rise or fall in price by 
buying contracts to acquire the commodities in question at a future date 
for a specified price which fits the buyer’s risk profile.  Thus, an airline 
can hedge against the risk that aviation fuel will rise sharply in price 
over a three-month period by buying a contract to acquire a certain 
amount of that fuel three months after the futures contract is made, at a 
price that is within limits the airline considers reasonable.  On the other 
side, a producer of grain can hedge against a sharp drop in grain prices 
six months hence by making a contract to sell a large part of its 
 
attempting to regulate the rating process.  See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1385–87. 
128. See Partnoy, supra note 82, at 648, 651, 664–65. 
129. See Lowenstein, supra note 116, at 37–38.   
130. See Statement of Joseph R. Mason, supra note 113, at 3. 
131. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 93, at 509.  See generally René M. Stulz, 
Demystifying Financial Derivatives, MILKEN INST. REV., Third Quarter 2005, at 20. 
132. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 47–48 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 
Clarendon Press 1908).  
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production of the grain at something approaching present prices six 
months in the future.133  Commodities futures are relatively well 
understood, and the garden variety—chiefly consisting of futures 
contracts traded on the Chicago Board of Trade—is regulated by the 
Federal Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).134 
During the 1990s, however, derivative securities were developed 
based on anticipated changes in the values of CDOs, which functioned 
more to multiply the level of risk than to hedge against rationally 
anticipated future changes in value.135  These new derivatives added 
increasing levels of complexity to what had already become complex 
financial instruments.  The most basic of these derivatives were “credit 
default swap” (CDS) transactions, in which one financial institution 
agreed to pay the other if specified CDOs held by the other defaulted, in 
return for fees corresponding to insurance premiums.136  The contracts 
creating rights to receive payments on default, and rights to receive fees 
for protecting holders of debt-based collateral, both derived value from 
that collateral, and were thus considered “derivative” securities.137 
 
133. See Stulz, supra note 131, at 22; Glyn A. Holton, Futures, RISKGLOSSARY.COM, 
http://www.riskglossary.com/link/future.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2012). 
134. See generally Mission & Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING 
COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 
2012).  
135. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 126–27; Cris Sholto Heaton, The Dangers of 
Derivatives, MONEYWEEK (Sept. 27, 2006), http://www.moneyweek.com/investments/stock-
markets/the-dangers-of-derivatives. 
136. Credit default swaps were invented by JPMorgan in 1994.  See Matthew Philips, The 
Monster That Ate Wall Street: How ‘Credit Default Swaps’—An Insurance Against Bad 
Loans—Turned From a Smart Bet Into a Killer, NEWSWEEK: THE DAILY BEAST (Sept. 26, 
2008, 8:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/09/26/the-monster-that-ate-
wall-street.html.  The first major CDS deal, involving about $9.7 billion, was done by Morgan 
in 1997.  Id.  Their use grew exponentially until the CDS market volume exceeded $45 trillion 
by mid-2007, more than twice the value of equities traded on U.S. stock markets.  See Janet 
Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?, TIME (Mar. 17, 2008), 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html.  CDS transactions could be 
described as riskier versions of earlier use of monoline insurance policies—riskier in that 
swap counterparties are not regulated insurers, and lack diversification in the portfolios of 
securities that they insured.  Id.  Ironically, JPMorgan itself made 2012 headlines by losing 
billions of dollars through inappropriate use of CDS transactions.  See David Henry & 
Carrick Mollenkamp, Analysis: The Core Problems with JPMorgan’s Failed Trades, REUTERS 
(May 14, 2012, 2:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/14/us-jpmorgan-trades-
idUSBRE84D04X20120514. 
137. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron Rerun: The Credit Crisis in Three Easy Pieces, in 
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC 
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A CDO based solely on derivative rights is known as a “synthetic” 
CDO,138 and the risks incurred by holders of its various tranches—and 
hence its value—is, because of the added level of complexity, much 
harder to determine than an asset-backed security collateralized by 
direct obligations.139  This was particularly true before the collapse of the 
housing bubble in 2007, when Moody’s, for example, did not reevaluate 
the models it used for its ratings before the looming disaster became 
clear even to the rating agencies.140 
In part, this was because the instruments used as reference portfolios 
for CDOs141 were evaluated for quality largely based on ratings assigned 
to them by agencies, such as Moody’s, based on mathematical models 
that relied on unproven assumptions rather than on due diligence as to 
the soundness of underlying collateral.142  Moreover, even had due 
diligence on underlying collateral been performed, the complexity of the 
new instruments became so great that even those who traded them in 
huge volume had no way to rationally evaluate their underlying value.143  
 
FAILURE, supra note 1, at 43, 43–45, 49 n.5; van Rixtel & Criado, supra note 96, at 242. 
138. See Sanjeev Arora et al., Computational Complexity and Informational Asymmetry 
in Financial Products 1 (Princeton Univ., Working Paper 2009), available at 
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~rongge/derivative.pdf (noting that use of derivatives in financial 
products increases information asymmetry between sellers and buyers so that even a buyer 
with substantial information and great computational power cannot adequately compute their 
value); Michael S. Gibson, Understanding the Risk of Synthetic CDOs 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd., 
Working Paper No. 2004-36, 2004). 
139. See Martin, supra note 81, at 204; Arora et al., supra note 138; Gibson, supra note 
138, at 1, 18, 21, 23, 25–26 (models used in disclosure of risks in various tranches of CDOs 
result in systematic failure by CDO sellers to disclose full risks imposed on buyers). 
140. See Lowenstein, supra note 116, at 39–40. 
141. A reference portfolio consists of real assets in other CDOs by which the value of a 
synthetic CDO is determined, usually linked to the real debt instruments in the other CDOs 
by credit default swaps.  See FITCH RATINGS, SYNTHETIC OVERVIEW FOR CMBS 
INVESTORS 1, 7 (Sept. 26, 2005), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/ABS/synthetic
_cmbs.pdf.  Since the buyer of a tranche in a synthetic CDO does not directly own the 
underlying collateral, but only derivatives based on their assumed likelihood of default, the 
buyer cannot perform due diligence on the quality of the underlying assets.  See id. at 1, 7–8. 
142. See generally Gibson, supra note 138. 
143. See Martin, supra note 81, at 204.  In fact, mathematical models used to determine 
the probability of default are so complex that they require their users to make substantial, 
possibly counterfactual assumptions.  See generally GORDY, supra note 91.  The complexity of 
the computations used by modelers such as Gordy, requiring elaborate numerical integration, 
suggests that results in terms of the probability of default under any model will be altered 
with extreme sensitivity based on any deviation from initial data or assumptions—in other 
words, any change from initial assumptions will cause chaotic, and hence unpredictable, 
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Since most of them were exempt from registration under the Securities 
Act because their sales were exempt from registration under SEC Rule 
506,144 most were created in private contracts between institutions and 
traded over the counter rather than on recognized exchanges.145  
Therefore, central banks such as the Federal Reserve and other 
regulatory institutions were unable to estimate their volume—which was 
trillions of dollars worldwide—or what effect defaults in underlying 
collateral would have on the entire financial house of cards and thus, 
given the effects on key financial institutions—on the U.S. and world 
economies.146 
C. The Downward Spiral of Quality in Collateral: The Great Debt 
Bubble of 1998–2006 
While part of the fragility of the CDO market was a function of the 
 
variations from the results predicted by the model used for the initial rating of a security.  
Chaotic behavior of this kind is what makes long-term weather prediction impossible even 
with high-quality data.  See JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 8 (1987); see 
also James K. Galbraith, The Roots of the Crisis and How to Bring It to a Close, in LESSONS 
FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, 
supra note 1, at 37, 38 (noting that Mandelbrot’s new mathematics of fractal geometry—the 
field of mathematics that has become known as “chaos”—challenged traditional economic 
models).  The intractability of this problem is further supported by the failure of sophisticated 
mathematical methods to prevent the insolvency of Long-Term Capital Management, a large 
hedge fund that employed Nobel laureates in economics.  See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN 
GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000); 
POSNER, supra note 1, at 131–32 (“[I]t’s impossible to calculate the exact conditions that will 
precipitate collapse, and this uncertainty makes it impossible to predict the collapse with any 
precision.”).  LCTM failed despite sophisticated mathematical models because sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions made it impossible for the models to predict failure when 
actual conditions varied from their assumptions.  POSNER, supra note 1, at 131–32  
144. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2012).  
145. See Whalen, supra note 19, at 9 (explosive growth of demand for non-transparent 
OTC instruments, where risk could not be modeled except by dealers who sold them and not 
by buyers or rating agencies, helped create the global financial crisis when dealers stopped 
providing a secondary market for them in 2007). 
146. See Implementing Derivatives Reform: Reducing Systemic Risk and Improving 
Market Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Aff., 112th 
Cong. 1–3 (2012) (statement of Gary Gensler, Chairman, CFTC), avaialable at  
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=10c178ef-
a902-4842-9972-ca169eaceb7d (noting that the notional value of the global market for swaps, 
largely unregulated before the 2008 crisis, now exceeds $700 trillion); Bruce I. Jacobs, 
Tumbling Tower of Babel: Subprime Securitization and the Credit Crisis, in LESSONS FROM 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra 
note 1, at 225. 
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complexity of the instruments traded in that market,147 an even more 
significant factor arose with the increasing burdens of debt borne both 
by individuals and institutions, originating in stagnating individual 
incomes and fed by easy credit, that led to the housing bubble, which 
took off after the turn of the century.148  Consumer debt began rising as 
early as the 1970s, in part to replace actual income—median per capita 
income in the U.S. leveled off in 1973,149 and consumers substituted debt 
for increasing income to maintain expected standards of living.150  This 
long-term structural problem was aggravated by events in the financial 
sector. 
A preliminary crisis, which should have warned participants in the 
market for complex securities of the larger crisis to come, was the failure 
of a hedge fund called Long-Term Capital Management in 1998.151  The 
hedge fund had based its investing strategy on complex mathematical 
models, which failed it both because of the complexity of the 
instruments in which the fund invested and because of the weakness in 
the collateral underlying those instruments.152  The Federal Reserve, 
fearing that the failure could trigger a recession, cut interest rates to 
near-record lows.153  The Federal Reserves’ action was based not only on 
 
147. See Kettering, supra note 115; Lipson, supra note 137, at 43–44; supra Part II.B. and 
accompanying text. 
148. See Edward Luce, The Dream That Died: The Crisis of Middle-Class America, FT 
WEEKEND MAG., July 31–Aug. 1, 2010, at 18, 22 (stating that incomes of bottom 90% of U.S. 
families essentially flat since 1973, with lost increases in wage income made up by increasing 
debt). 
149. See id.  
150. See id. 
151. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 126.  A hedge fund is an investment company—i.e., a 
fund that invests in securities or other assets of other businesses—that, because most of its 
investors are “accredited” for purposes of SEC Rule 506 (most benefit funds are accredited 
investors for purposes of Rule 506, see infra note 282, 333 and accompanying text), is usually 
not required to register with the SEC.  See Hedging Your Bets: A Heads Up on Hedge Funds 
and Funds of Hedge Funds, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2012).  Hedge funds, originally small investment vehicles used by 
wealthy individuals, came to control major assets by the 1990s, and their risky investment 
strategies made them a factor in world financial instability.  See Duff McDonald, The Running 
of the Hedgehogs, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 16, 2007, at 42–44.  By 2007, this destabilizing potential 
had grown tenfold from the 1990s, with over $2 trillion under hedge fund management.  Id. 
152. See Hershey H. Friedman & Linda Weiser Friedman, The Global Financial Crisis of 
2008: What Went Wrong?, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 31, 31–32. 
153. See Steve Schifferes, Financial Crises: Lessons from History, BBC NEWS (Sept. 3, 
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the failure of Long-Term Capital at home, but on the bursting of 
financial bubbles overseas that helped to kill Long-Term Capital, 
including sovereign default crises in Asia, Russia, and Latin America, 
and the bursting of the “dot-com” stock market bubble in the U.S. 
which, continuing through 2002, helped motivate the Federal Reserves 
to keep down interest rates.154  These low rates, which were reflected in 
loans made throughout the U.S. economy, including the markets for 
government and corporate debt and the home mortgage market, helped 
lead to the outsized housing bubble of the new century.155 
The low yields on conventional debt had two significant effects.  On 
one side, investors, particularly benefit funds that needed higher yields 
to fund eventual demands by beneficiaries, began to chase higher yields 
in new types of financial instruments, despite their poor understanding 
of the risks inherent in these investments.156  On the other side, low 
prevailing interest rates made it easier for debtors, especially home 
mortgagors, to afford homes previously beyond their ability to acquire, 
helping to inflate a housing bubble that was further aggravated by 
relaxed lending practices.157 
The reduction in the general cost of credit, which itself played an 
important role in inflating the housing bubble that followed the turn of 
the century, accompanied successive and dramatic lowering of the 
standards of creditworthiness required of mortgagors.  The federal 
government played a major part in this, by steadily lowering the 
minimum down payments required for FHA insurance, and pressuring 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to lower their creditworthiness 
requirements for mortgages they would purchase.158  The government’s 
 
2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6958091.stm. 
154. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: 
EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 162, 171, 206–07 (2009).  
155. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 13–14, 40–41 (2d ed. 2005); 
Lipson, supra note 137, at 46 (noting that the “persistent, artificially low prevailing rate of 
interest” was a central cause of the financial crisis).  During the bubble, the Case-Shiller 
housing price index, as compared to increase in GDP and the consumer price index, increased 
faster and farther than any previous housing bubble since 1891, the starting point for the 
Case-Shiller index.  See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 154, at 207. 
156. See Roger Lowenstein, Looking for the Next Crisis?: Public Pension Funds Are 
Massively Short of Money, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 27, 2010, at 9; Walsh & Hakim, supra note 
63. 
157. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 46–49 (lower mortgage rates increased housing prices 
and leverage, increasing systemic risk to the entire economy). 
158. See id. at 241–42. 
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purpose was to make housing more available to Americans of limited 
means, a goal that, while not without superficial appeal, was fraught 
with financial peril, as easier lending standards led home prices in the 
U.S. to rise 52% between 1997 and 2004, a rate significantly higher than 
the increase in median income.159 
While standards for conventional mortgages were eased, mortgage 
underwriting standards were further relaxed by private lenders, many of 
whom were now unlicensed and used a lending model based on 
originating mortgages to sell them for packaging into securities, rather 
than holding them and the risk attendant upon them.160  The result was a 
proliferation of “Alt-A” mortgages—mortgages to borrowers who could 
not quite meet the standards imposed on holders of conventional 
mortgages161—and, worse yet, “subprime” loans—loans backed by 
mortgages extended to borrowers who did not even approach the 
relaxed federal standards for creditworthiness, documentation, and 
other qualifications, such as substantial down payments that were 
required for conventional mortgages during the 1990s.162  “Subprime” 
mortgages were often originated by poorly regulated mortgage brokers 
on an originate-to-sell business model, so that their originators lacked 
the incentive to assure their quality that would have existed had they 
kept the loans on their balance sheets.163  This in itself set them off from 
traditional mortgages backing loans by institutions such as banks and 
thrifts, which started with a model of loans kept on their balance sheets 
and therefore had some incentive to assure that they were likely to be 
repaid.  “Subprime” mortgages began to proliferate before the turn of 
 
159. See SHILLER, supra note 155, at 12–13. 
160. See Danielle DiMartino & John V. Duca, The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages, 
ECONOMICLETTER, Nov. 2007, at 2. 
161. See FRANK J. FABOZZI, FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 286 (2nd ed. 2002); Alt A 
Mortgages, CITYTOWNINFO.COM, http://www.citytowninfo.com/mortgage-articles/specialty-
mortgages/alt-a-mortgages (last visited Sept. 23, 2012) (noting that Alt-A mortgages were 
traditionally mortgages to borrowers who could meet conventional mortgage standards, but 
lacked certain documentation; but the designation became a fuzzy term applying to 
mortgages just short of conventional mortgage quality but ranking above “subprime” 
mortgages). 
162. See FABOZZI, supra note 161, at 284. 
163. See Baily et al., supra note 76, at 79, 80–83 (noting that when mortgage lenders 
originated mortgages intending to sell them for securitization, the mortgages were not kept 
on their balance sheets, so they lacked incentive to guard against potential defaults). 
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the century, and exploded in volume from 2003 through 2006.164 
“Subprime” mortgages included several characteristics that made 
them, and financial instruments for which they served as, collateral 
financial time bombs.  Many included specific features that set them 
ticking, such as low “teaser” interest rates that mortgagors could barely 
afford at the time they signed on the dotted line, but which would 
automatically reset to far higher rates—likely to be beyond the 
mortgagors’ ability to pay—at dates in the near future.165  Other 
subprime mortgages whose default could readily have been predicted at 
the time they were made included “liar loans,” where the mortgagors’ 
creditworthiness was deliberately misrepresented or totally 
undocumented, or where the value of the mortgaged property was 
deliberately inflated;166 interest-only loans, where mortgagors would not 
have to begin repaying principal until a specified time in the future;167 
and home equity loans based on the equity acquired by the upward 
spiral of home values based on artificially low credit.168 
Relaxed standards led to a proliferation of new mortgage lending to 
borrowers who represented not merely heightened risks that could be 
 
164. See, e.g., Abol Jalilvand & A.G. (Tassos) Malliaris, Sequence of Asset Bubbles and 
the Global Financial Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 139, 141 (noting that the 
Federal Reserve contributed to the housing bubble by setting low interest rates in 2003 
intended to deal with low economic growth); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank 
Structure and Competition: The Subprime Mortgage Market (May 17, 2007), available at http:
//www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm (noting that subprime 
mortgage lending, defined as lending to borrowers with high credit risk, proliferated as a 
result of securitization). 
165. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 154, at 213; Bernanke, supra note 164, at 2–
3 (pointing out that “seasoned” adjustable rate mortgages—those that have been paid on for 
several years—have higher delinquency rates); supra note 164 and accompanying text.  
166. See John Hechinger, Shaky Foundation: Rising Home Prices Cast Appraisers in a 
Harsh Light, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2002, at A1 (brokers and developers systematically 
induced real estate appraisers to put unrealistically high values on real estate, with frauds 
resulting in legal actions well before the actual topping out of real estate prices in 2006); 
Lowenstein, supra note 116, at 38. 
167. See David Streitfeld, The House Trap: As an Exotic Mortgage Resets, Payments 
Skyrocket, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at B1 (noting that interest-only loans, which are 
scheduled to reset to begin amortizing principal, pose threat of large-scale mortgage defaults 
in wake of bursting of housing bubble). 
168. See Forrest Pafenberg, The Single-Family Mortgage Industry in the Internet Era: 
Technology Developments and Market Structure, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 163, 171 . 
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estimated with actuarial models based on prior data, but to borrowers 
who were virtually certain to default.  This qualitative transformation 
could have been recognized from earlier experience if regulators, rating 
agencies, and other participants in the issuance of asset-backed 
securities had paid attention to it.169  The net effect was to invalidate the 
waterfall model on which the rating agencies based the high ratings they 
assigned to senior tranches of asset-backed securities: while higher-risk 
collateral could still permit repayment of senior tranches if there was 
enough of it and it paid something, zero-value collateral, regardless of 
its nominal value, could not yield any payment to a senior tranche 
regardless of its level of seniority.170 
III.  THINGS FALL APART: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The threat that benefit funds face based on pre-crash transactions 
has two dimensions: (1) states and state subdivisions such as cities, 
hospitals, and associations of public employees have invested far too 
little in their benefit funds to meet predictable demands;171 and (2) the 
investments that they have made are subject to high risk of default 
because they include instruments such as CDOs backed by underlying 
loans that have defaulted, are in grave risk of default, or cannot 
currently be valued at all because it is unclear what their base-level 
collateral is worth in terms of the capacity of obligors to make 
payments, or, in the absence of such payments, on foreclosure.172  The 
issues of underfunding and investment uncertainty are closely linked, 
since many funds made improvident investments in order to improve 
yields on the funds they received in order to be able to make future 
 
169. See Baily et al., supra note 76, at 83 (noting that market participants and regulators 
failed to manage risk at every stage of securitization); Joseph R. Mason, The (Continuing) 
Information Problems in Structured Finance, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Spring 2008, at 7–8 (noting 
that mortgage-backed securities will not make “subsequent recoveries that will restore 
investors”); Lowenstein, supra note 116. 
170. See Jeffrey A. Lenobel & Gregory P. Pressman, Mortgage-Backed Security Process 
Undergoes Change, N.Y. L. J., Mar. 29, 1999, at S1 (AAA-rated senior tranche holders will 
receive reduction in income to the extent that losses cannot be absorbed by subordinate 
tranches); Gibson, supra note 138, at 9–11 (noting that cash CDOs require cash flow to fund 
all tranches—and even senior tranches may be subordinate to deal structuring fees). 
171. See Joseph De Avila, Pension Overhaul is Urged, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2012, at 
A15 (noting that Connecticut, for example, is the third lowest state in pension funding, with 
enough savings to cover a mere 53% of its obligations).  
172. Evans, supra note 4.   
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payments to their beneficiaries.173 
The CDO crisis, and effective measures both to deal with its 
lingering fallout and to prevent future crises of similar origin, can be 
understood only in terms of the regulatory system in place both in the 
U.S. and in other countries to protect investors and financial institutions 
against such events.  This Article will deal particularly with U.S. 
securities regulation, established in the wake of the Crash of 1929 and 
the subsequent Great Depression, whose partial dismantling under the 
guise of deregulation, beginning in the 1970s, helped to set the stage for 
the current crisis. 
A.  The Crumbling Firewall: Deregulation and the Financial Crisis 
Investments by benefit funds in risky securities are subject to three 
major federal statutes governing the sale of securities: the Securities 
Act,174 the Exchange Act,175 and the Investment Advisers Act.176  Each is 
hedged about with regulations promulgated by the SEC and by a 
framework of judicial interpretation. 
Since the 1970s, deregulation, motivated largely by political 
ideology,177 led to the weakening of protective statutes and regulations, 
and judicial decisions that limited the scope and force of existing 
regulatory law, with the result of pulling some of the teeth from the 
aging tiger of securities regulation.178  Ironically, the SEC itself began the 
process, first by accepting securities receiving top ratings from the credit 
rating agencies as part of the capital of the brokerages that it 
regulated,179 and then, even more significantly, by its regulatory 
 
173. See supra notes 19–24, 62–64 and accompanying text. 
174. Securities Act 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006). 
175. Exchange Act § 78a.  
176. Investment Advisers Act § 80b-20. 
177. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 134–36.  It is significant that Judge Posner, once a 
strong advocate of deregulation, agrees on this point with his one-time ideological opponent, 
Paul Krugman, a Nobel Prize-winning economist.  See id.; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Reagan 
Did It, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A21 (noting that the financial crash largely caused by 
explosion of private debt due largely to financial deregulation based on political ideology 
beginning in the 1980s). 
178. See David S. Bieri, Regulation and Financial Stability in the Age of Turbulence, in 
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC 
FUTURE, supra note 1, at 327, 331 (banking crises of the last 30 years largely due to ineffective 
and complacent regulation shaped by the interference of special interests).  
179. See Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(F)(1) (2011); Definition of 
 
12 - MENDALES FINAL PRINTER 12/28/2012  11:14 AM 
276 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:241 
 
expansion of the small business exemptions for registration of securities 
into exemptions that went well beyond the Securities Act’s purposes in 
authorizing such exemptions.180 
Congress accelerated financial deregulation during the 1970s.  This 
began with the lifting of some key regulations on savings and loan 
institutions (thrifts), at that time among the most important originators 
of mortgages, which were regulated separately from banks.181  The toxic 
effect of this deregulation was felt in the massive failures of deregulated 
institutions, which caused a national financial crisis that spanned the 
1980s,182 but this crisis did not slow the deregulatory juggernaut. 
The hallowed separation between commercial and investment 
banking,183 which was the most conspicuous example of this 
 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8570 
& 34-51572, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,306 (proposed Apr. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
240). 
180. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1373–74.  See generally SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 
346 U.S. 119 (1953) (noting that exemptions apply where there is no practical need for 
protection of the 1933 Act or where its benefits are too remote). 
181. This deregulation was largely accomplished by the Garn-St. Germain Depository 
Institutions Act, Pub. L. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982), which removed Depression-era 
limitations on savings and loan institutions, leading to massive failures of savings and loans 
beginning in the mid-1980s.  See Krugman, supra note 177. 
182. More financial institutions failed during the savings and loan crisis than at any time 
since the Great Depression.  From 1986 through 1995, the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance 
Corporation (which was itself wound up as a result of its liabilities from the crisis) and the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (established by Congress to deal with the crisis) combined 
closed 1,043 thrift institutions with $519 billion in assets, and the number of federally insured 
thrifts in the U.S. declined by about 50%.  See Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the 
Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV., No. 2, 2000, at 
26.  The savings and loan crisis was the most famous part of a larger banking crisis in which 
more than 1,600 FDIC-insured banks were closed or required financial assistance from the 
FDIC.  See 1 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE 
FUTURE 3 (1997).  
183. Commercial and investment banking were separated by one of the statutory 
foundations of New Deal regulation, the Glass-Steagall Act, formally titled the Banking Act 
of 1933.  Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C).  Glass-Steagall did far more than accomplish this separation; it included other 
measures to restore confidence in the financial system, shaken by the Great Depression, such 
as establishing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  Id. § 12B(a).  The 
wisdom of separating commercial and investment banking has, in the context of the current 
world economic crisis, been recognized outside the U.S.  See Ali Qassim, U.K. Must Separate 
Retail From Investment Banking to Encourage Change in Culture, INT’L BUS. & FIN. DAILY 
(July 3, 2012), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/ms/document/XLVBTFG5GVG0 (noting that 
Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, has recognized the need for such a 
separation in the U.K.). 
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deregulation, was abolished by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,184 
exposing commercial banks to the risks involved in underwriting and 
dealing in securities, including the new complex breeds of securities, and 
adding to risks to the entire financial system by promoting the growth of 
too-big-to-fail financial institutions.185  The mischief wrought by Gramm-
Leach-Bliley, which manifested itself in the financial crisis, went well 
beyond ending the long-standing Berlin Wall between commercial and 
investment banking: notably, for example, it barred the SEC from 
regulating securities-based swap agreements beyond the general 
antifraud provisions of the securities laws.186  The shackles on federal 
regulation of derivatives were tightened further by the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000,187 which barred the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission from regulating swaps not based on 
securities, notably including credit default risk swaps.188 
Beyond legal limitations placed on its authority by statute during the 
thirty years preceding the financial crisis, the SEC has been chronically 
starved for legal and accounting firepower, limiting its ability to assure 
 
184. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811) (repealing sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall).  The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act was formally titled the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.  Id.  
Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s destruction of the wall between commercial and investment banking 
has been modified by the incorporation of the “Volcker Rule” in Dodd-Frank section 619, 
which at first glance appears to bar federally insured banking institutions from engaging in 
proprietary trading.  Dodd-Frank Act § 619(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2011).  
However, the section, read as a whole, is so permeated with the typical Dodd-Frank foam of 
compromise that its real effectiveness is uncertain. Of particular concern for purposes of this 
Article, Dodd-Frank section 619(g)(2) states that the section should not be construed to 
prohibit an affected institution from engaging in securitization of loans.  See id. § 619(g)(2).  
Despite the questionable efficacy of the provision, it has come under strong partisan attack in 
Congress which (a) makes it unclear whether the drafting of implementing regulations will be 
funded, and (b) makes its long-term survival uncertain.  See, e.g., Josh Boak, Volcker Rule 
Shredded by Republicans, POLITICO (Jan. 18, 2012, 12:56 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/
stories/0112/71602.html (noting that after agencies charged with enforcing rule released 300 
pages of proposed regulations, key Republicans attacked the rule itself as a “self-inflicted 
wound”). 
185. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services 
Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 ILL. L. REV. 215, 
303–04, 446. 
186. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 761–763, 766, 768. 
187. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 101, 114 
Stat. 2763, 2763A-452.  This limitation has also been repealed, subsequent to the financial 
crisis.  See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 713–15. 
188. Commodity Futures Modernization Act app. § 3A; see Dodd-Frank Act §§ 713–15. 
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compliance with the securities laws in the face of rapidly expanding 
securities markets.189  It has therefore generally welcomed the judicial 
recognition of private rights of action for violations of securities statutes 
and regulations, particularly Securities Exchange Act sections 10(b)190 
and 14(a),191 and the SEC’s Rules 10b-5192 and 14a-9193 (the antifraud 
provision of the SEC’s Proxy Rules promulgated pursuant to 14(a)).194  
After initially recognizing these rights of action, however, the courts 
quickly reversed course, refusing to permit parties other than the SEC 
to redress violations of other provisions of the securities laws through 
litigation, unless such rights were expressly conferred by statute.195  
Judicial decisions have not only refused to imply new rights of action for 
violation of the securities laws, but have increasingly curbed the ability 
of parties other than the SEC to maintain actions under the statutes and 
regulations for which private rights of action have already been 
recognized.196 
 
189. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985) (SEC 
stated in amicus brief that while securities markets had greatly expanded as of 1983, its own 
enforcement resources had declined); Barbara Black, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: Reliance on Deceptive Conduct and the Future of Securities Fraud 
Class Actions, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 330, 338 (2008) (stating that empirical studies show the SEC 
cannot by itself enforce the law against all wrongdoers); Crimmins, supra note 36; Mike 
Ferullo, Experts Say Missed Dodd-Frank Deadlines Increasingly Common; Lawmakers 
Accept It, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 19, at 965, 965–66 (May 9, 2011) (“Some of the 
regulators have a budget problem, but all of them face a talent problem in finding and hiring 
new staff.”). 
190. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
191. Id. § 78n(a). 
192. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
193. See Id. § 240.14a-9.  
194. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964) (holding that shareholder 
had a private right of action under the § 14(a) and the Proxy Rules).  The private right of 
action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was recognized by lower federal courts as early as 1946.  
Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).  However, it was not 
recognized by the Supreme Court until 1971.  Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. 
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1971). 
195. The Supreme Court expressly refused to recognize a private right of action under 
the Investment Advisers Act.  See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 
11, 24 (1979).  The Court has also refused to recognize private rights of action under other 
provisions of the securities laws such as section 17(a) of the Exchange Act.  See Touche Ross 
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979) (“§ 17(a) . . . . does not, by its terms, purport to 
create a private cause of action in favor of anyone.”). 
196. The Supreme Court began to restrict the ability of private plaintiffs to bring actions 
under Rule 10b-5 almost immediately after recognizing it.  See Affiliated UTE Citizens v. 
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B.  Prelude: The Credit Bubble Reaches Its Limits 
Warnings that the housing bubble was unsustainable appeared at 
least as early as 2004.197  The bubble continued to inflate, however.  
Benefit funds, trying to obtain 8% yields in a world where conventional 
investments were paying 3%, continued to invest in complex 
instruments that appeared to promise the yields they sought and sold 
based on high ratings and dealers’ deceptive promises of safety.198  The 
total volume of complex structured instruments being created continued 
to expand dramatically.199  As the bubble reached the peak of its 
expansion, clear signs of an impending financial crisis appeared late in 
2006, when U.S. housing prices first leveled off and then began to 
decline.200  The implications of this beginning of the long slide toward 
economic disaster for asset-backed securities were quickly felt.  By June, 
 
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972) (requiring plaintiff to show “causation in fact”).  More 
recently, it has drawn not only upon the text of the PSLRA but on Congressional intent in 
adopting the PSLRA to reduce the ability of plaintiffs other than the SEC to bring actions 
under Exchange Act 10(b).  See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 
314, 323–24 (2007).  Even where the PSLRA does not apply, the present majority on the 
Court has sharply restricted implied rights of action under the securities laws to the point 
where the Court has implied that it accepts their existence only because of stare decisis.  See 
Janus Capital Grp v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 2301–03 (2011) (noting that 
though existence of private right of action under Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
“remains the law,” it must be given narrow scope). 
197. See SHILLER, supra note 155, at 40–41; see also Yuliya Demyanyk, Ten Myths 
About Subprime Mortgages, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 87, 91 (noting that as early 
as 2001–2005, “signs of the crisis brewing . . . were hidden behind a mask of rising house 
prices”). 
198. See Lowenstein, supra note 116, at 40–41 (Moody’s was slow to announce it was 
changing its model for rating asset-backed securities, and actually lowering ratings, though it 
was aware of the securities’ deterioration in quality); Evans, supra note 4 (“The county was 
earning 8 percent in what was a 3 1/2 percent world . . . .”).  Because most asset-backed 
securities sold to benefit funds were unregistered, they were not subject to the SEC’s Plain 
English disclosure rules, and dealers in the securities enjoyed substantial benefits from 
asymmetrical information sold even to large and sophisticated funds.  See Whalen, supra note 
19, at 8; Arora et al., supra note 138, at 1.  See generally OFFICE INVESTOR EDUC. 
ASSISTANCE, supra note 58. 
199. See Barth et al., supra note 1, at 97; Jon A. Garfinkel & Jarjisu Sa-Aadu, A Decade 
of Living Dangerously: The Causes and Cosequences of the Mortgage, Financial, and 
Economic Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 103, 103–04. 
200. See Ashok Bardhan, Of Subprimes and Sundry Symptoms: The Political Economy 
of the Financial Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, 
AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at  17, 18. 
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2007, the investment banking firm Bear Stearns, which had been 
particularly aggressive in generating CDOs despite the deteriorating 
quality of the underlying collateral, was forced to bail out two of its 
affiliated hedge funds because of the sharp deterioration of their CDO 
assets.201 
C.  The Financial Crisis: The Crash of 2008 
Over the next year, the depth of the developing crisis became 
apparent as Bear Stearns itself spiraled toward insolvency.  On March 
14, 2008, the Federal Reserve provided emergency financial assistance 
to keep Bear Stearns out of bankruptcy, and two days later, in an 
exercise of its powers not employed since the crises of the 1930s, 
provided $30 billion in backing as the venerable Wall Street firm was 
sold at a fire-sale price to Morgan Stanley.202 
Despite signs of impending crisis that had multiplied during 2007, 
workaround measures by the Federal Reserve and private financial 
institutions working with it to save troubled institutions such as Bear 
Stearns kept the slide toward world financial crisis slow and largely 
below the radar of the financial markets until the third quarter of 2008.203  
By that time, subprime mortgages, which had increased from 9% of 
newly securitized mortgages in 2001 to 40% in 2006,204 began to cascade 
into default; it became apparent to the financial community that CDO 
ratings were meaningless, and the solvency of the institutions holding 
them was therefore itself questionable. 
The crisis came to a head with the failure of Lehman Brothers in 
2008.  Lehman was “too big to fail,” both in the sense that it was so large 
a component of the international financial condition that its failure 
entailed severe consequences,205 and that it was too big for the Federal 
 
201. See Matthew Goldstein, Bear Stearns’ Subprime Bath, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (June 12, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-06-12/bear-stearn
s-subprime-bathbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice; Corey Hajim 
& Adam Lashinsky, How Bear Stearns Lost Its Way, CNNMONEY (Aug. 21, 2007, 5:59 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/20/magazines/fortune/bear_stearns.fortune/index.htm. 
202. See Associated Press, In Bear Bailout, Fed Says It Tried to Avert Contagion, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 2008, at C4 (Federal Reserve assistance in bailing out Bear Stearns was 
“unprecedented”). 
203. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1, at 118–26 (warnings about housing bubble were 
initially ignored). 
204. See DiMartino & Duca, supra note 160. 
205. See, e.g., GEORGE SOROS, REFLECTIONS ON THE CRASH OF 2008 AND WHAT IT 
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Reserve to bail out with the resources it had at hand.206  The Federal 
Reserve was unable to find a purchaser for the firm, and allowed it to 
file for bankruptcy—the largest bankruptcy in dollar terms in U.S. 
history.207  At this point, financial markets all over the world slid 
downward at a pace threatening to rival the Great Crash of 1929, as it 
became clear that many large financial institutions around the world 
held much of their capital in financial instruments that were either 
worthless or impossible to value.208  Interbank lending, the lifeblood of 
international commerce, froze because institutions worried that their 
borrowers—even in the “too big to fail” class—might be insolvent.  With 
financial institutions around the world unable to engage in routine 
short-term lending to each other, the real threat emerged as a worldwide 
economic collapse comparable to the Great Depression of the 1930s.209 
As noted below, governments and central banks acted quickly and 
drastically in attempts to contain the crisis.210  Their efforts, however, fell 
short of dealing in full with the exigencies of the crisis, both in terms of 
expenditures and in terms of regulations to stabilize the financial 
environment and to prevent further crises from springing up from seeds 
planted in the years leading up to the initial crisis.211  It is therefore 
 
MEANS: AN E-BOOK UPDATE TO THE NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS 161 
(2009) (Lehman was a major issuer of and market-maker for commercial paper). 
206. See Abigail Field, Why the U.S. Balked at Bailing Out Lehman, DAILYFINANCE 
(Mar. 15, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/03/15/why-the-u-s-balked-at-
bailout-out-lehman/. 
207. Lehman filed its bankruptcy petition with about $613 billion in scheduled debt, 
nearly six times as much as in the largest previously filed bankruptcy case.  See Sam Mamudi, 
Lehman Folds with Record $613 Billion Debt, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 15, 2008, 10:11 AM), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-folds-with-record-613-billion-debt.  Almost 
simultaneously with the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, another “too big to fail” institution, 
Merrill Lynch, was pushed by the Treasury Department into acquisition by Bank of America 
in order to avert a similar fate.  See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Merrill is Sold: Failing to Find 
Buyer, Lehman Set to File for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1. 
208. See Posner, supra note 1, at vii–ix.  
209. See Austin Murphy, The Making and Ending of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, in 
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC 
FUTURE, supra note 1, at  125, 127–29.  Judge Richard A. Posner (among others) has argued 
that the continuing “economic downturn” following the 2007–2008 crisis should in fact be 
characterized as a “depression.”  See POSNER, supra note 1, at vii–x. 
210. See infra notes 220–28 and accompanying text. 
211. An example of the continued unfolding of the financial disaster that began in 2007 
is the crisis, still unfolding as of this writing, involving both institutional and sovereign debt in 
the countries that have adopted the euro as a common currency.  See, e.g., Timeline: The 
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necessary to discuss what has been accomplished, and what measures 
are still required to deal with the damage already done and to minimize 
future harm resulting from the excesses of the bubble years. 
IV.  THE SECURITIES LAWS AND INVESTMENTS BY BENEFIT FUNDS 
A.  Ad Hoc Responses: Trying to Contain the Crisis 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers was a “fire-bell in the night”212 
that precipitated a financial crisis of breadth and depth, which had not 
been seen since the great Crash of 1929.213  Every sector of the U.S. 
economy was affected, beginning with the credit and equity markets.214  
In late 2008, stocks plummeted from the all-time high levels reached in 
2007, much as they had done in 1929.215  The most widely followed stock 
index, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, dropped almost 2,400 points 
in eight trading days.216  Even more seriously, credit markets all over the 
world froze.217  Because financial institutions held large portions of their 
capital in the form of once highly rated CDOs, which now were worth 
substantially less than their nominal value, or whose value could not be 
computed at all, the institutions making up the system were reluctant to 
make the short-term loans to each other that the world financial system 
requires to function effectively.218  That, in turn, threatened to dry up 
 
Unfolding Eurozone Crisis, BBC NEWS: BUS. (Jun. 13, 2012, 10:08 AM), http://www.bbc.co.u
k/news/business-13856580. 
212. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes (April 22, 1820), in 4 MEMOIRS, 
CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332–33 (Thomas 
Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829) (stating that the controversy over slavery in U.S. territories 
alarmed him “like a fire-bell in the night”).  
213. See POSNER, supra note 1, at vii–x, 10–17; REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 154, at 
xli–xlv, 203–22, 233–39 (labeling current crisis as “the Second Great Contraction” comparable 
to that following the Crash of 1929). 
214. See Posner, supra note 1, at vii–ix. 
215. See id. at ix–x. 
216. See Kirk Shinkle, The Crash of 2008: How Bad Is It, and When Will It End?, 
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (Oct. 17, 2008), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-
finance/investing/articles/2008/10/17/the-crash-of-2008. 
217. See, e.g., David Goldman, Credit Freeze: What Lehman Wrought, CNNMONEY 
(Nov. 16, 2008, 7:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/14/news/economy/two_months_since
_lehman/index.htm. 
218. See POSNER, supra note 1, passim; Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime 
Financial Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 69, 69–70.  
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credit to businesses around the world that depended on the institutions 
for credit to keep running.219 
The result was a quick sequence of major interventions by Congress, 
the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury, and corresponding institutions 
of other major financial powers to shore up endangered private financial 
institutions that were “too big to fail,” and to restore liquidity to the 
international financial system.220  The level of commitment by 
governments, central banks, and major private institutions to this end 
was unprecedented in scope, size, and the level of international 
cooperation involved, continuing across national elections that 
transferred power from one political party to another. 
As the U.S. government struggled to keep the national economy 
from collapse, one of its first formal measures was to establish the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).221  This program was enacted 
by Congress as a monumental appropriation—$700 billion—to be used 
to purchase toxic assets from the financial institutions that had 
embedded them in their capital.222  The urgency of the crisis, however, 
made this gradual approach appear too slow to avoid the failure of at 
least some of the institutions concerned, and so the TARP was 
transformed into a fund for protecting the solvency of troubled 
institutions by directly extending credit to them or, in many cases, 
purchasing equity interests in them.223  The toxic assets, however, 
remained part of their capital, and continued to be a latent threat both 
to the institutions holding them and counterparties to swap transactions 
in which the counterparties agreed to assume at least part of the risk of 
 
219. See Goldman, supra note 217. 
220. Arguably, major benefit funds, which have thousands of beneficiaries and hundreds 
of billions of dollars in assets, are also “too big to fail.”  Defaults by major funds, cities, or 
possibly even states would have ripple effects that, like the failure of Lehman Brothers, would 
threaten the already fragile national economic recovery. 
221. TARP was created as the central part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (Supp. IV 
2011)).  
222. See id. § 115(a)(3).  Dodd-Frank Act reduced the amount of troubled assets the 
Department of Treasury could purchase to $475 billion.  See  Dodd-Frank Act § 1302, 12 
U.S.C. § 5225(a)(3) (Supp. IV 2011). 
223. The Treasury purchased more than $150 million in equity from fifty-two financial 
institutions with TARP funds from the creation of the TARP on October 3, 2008 through 
November 25, 2008.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-161, TROUBLED 
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO BETTER ENSURE 
INTEGRITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 16 (2008). 
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the assets involved.  This continues to be a significant threat to the world 
economy in recovering from the crisis of 2008.224 
In the U.S., government agencies also attempted to redraft the 
regulations which had embedded ratings issued by the conflicted credit 
rating agencies in the issuance of asset-backed securities.225  As the 
financial crisis moved toward its climax in 2008 and the rating agencies 
scrambled to lower their high ratings on securities based on defaulting 
mortgages, the SEC, for example, acknowledged that its prior use of 
ratings had been ill-advised and proposed amendments to its regulations 
that would limit their use going forward.226  These proposals, however, 
were limited in scope.  They were never implemented because the 
Dodd-Frank Act, enacted in 2010 to deal with some of the problems 
leading to the crash of 2008,227 superseded them both with self-executing 
provisions and with elaborate requirements for new, far more extensive 
regulations to be drafted by the SEC and other agencies dealing with 
ratings to limit their use and to make them, so far as they continued to 
be used, more reliable.228 
B.  Incomplete Answers: The Dodd-Frank Act and Preliminary Attempts 
at Regulation 
With the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,229 Congress attempted to deal 
 
224. See Murillo Campello et al., The Long-Term Cost of the Financial Crisis, in 
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC 
FUTURE, supra note 1, at 571, 577. 
225. See Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, SEC Release 
No. 34-61051, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,866 (proposed Dec. 4, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
240 & 249b) (proposing rules more strictly regulating rating agencies, offered for comment 
before passage of Dodd-Frank); see also Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64514, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,420, 33,421  (proposed 
June 8, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 & 249) (SEC had deferred 
consideration of original rules imposing stricter regulation of rating agencies and was now 
proposing new ones in response to Dodd-Frank). 
226. See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 34-58070, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,088 (proposed July 11, 
2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 & 249). 
227. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
228. See Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Fed. Reg. at 
33,420 & n.2 (the Commission had deferred considering action on its original proposed 
regulations in 2009, and was now proposing new rules mandated by Dodd-Frank Title IX, 
Subtitle C, Pub. L. No. 11-203 §§ 939, 939D-939F). 
229. 124 Stat. at 1376. 
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comprehensively with many of the problems underlying the financial 
crisis.  Dodd-Frank, together with regulations being drafted by the SEC, 
the CFTC, and other regulatory agencies to interpret the new statute 
and to give new force to prior regulatory statutes, contain some valuable 
provisions trapped within a mountain of verbiage.230  While, as we shall 
see, Dodd-Frank has major limitations, it is helpful to begin by 
reviewing the more effective provisions by which it attempts to deal with 
the problems discussed in this Article.  First, Dodd-Frank repeals 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s bar to the SEC regulation of swap agreements,231 
and gives the SEC and CFTC jurisdiction to establish regulations that, 
inter alia, require participants in swap agreements to clear them on 
recognized exchanges rather than, as before, simply creating them over 
the counter without public records.232  Regulations such as these will 
help regulators to ascertain the value of swaps outstanding, and thereby 
help to curb the volatility of financial markets generally—though 
derivatives such as swaps are inherently volatile and hard to value long-
term233—so that it is unlikely that any regulatory scheme can make 
instruments that include them as collateral suitable to be offered for sale 
to vulnerable parties such as benefit funds. 
 Dodd-Frank also imposes some limits on securitization which, while 
limited, improve upon prior law.  The most important of these is that it 
requires federal banking and securities regulators to formulate 
regulations to require the sellers of asset-backed securities to retain part 
of the risk of the assets such as mortgages that provide cash flow for the 
securities.234  There are several important problems with this section, 
 
230. See id. 
231. See Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (Supp. IV 2011).  
232. Id. § 8302.  Dodd-Frank Act Title VII gives the SEC jurisdiction over security-
based swaps; the CFTC jurisdiction over non-security based swaps such as those based on 
currencies; and the two have joint jurisdiction over instruments involving both securities and 
non-security-based swaps.  Id.  The agencies have begun promulgating the extensive 
regulations required to do so.  See, e.g., Interpretive Guidance for Cross-Border Application 
of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,214 (proposed 
July 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. chp. I) (CFTC guidance on the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
regulation governing cross-border credit default and interest rate swap agreements); see also 
Silla Brush, CFTC Proposes Swaps Clearing Determinations Under Dodd-Frank, 
BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-24/cftc-proposes-
swaps-clearing-determinations-under-dodd-frank-act.html; Derivatives, U.S. SEC. EXCH. 
COMM’N (July 11, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml. 
233. See, e.g., Friedman & Friedman, supra note 152, at 33. 
234. Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (Supp. IV 2011). 
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however: it is not self-executing, and requires regulations to be drafted 
by several different regulatory agencies to take effect.  Moreover, it 
specifies that the amount of risk retained is to be at least 5%, hardly 
enough to deter investment banking firms who took on enormous levels 
of risk during the period leading up to the 2008 debacle.235  Worse yet, 
the retention requirement does not apply to “qualified residential 
mortgages,” a term which the statute leaves to the agencies to define by 
regulation, but which presumably will include conventional mortgages.236  
As we have seen, the failure of mortgage-backed securities that 
triggered the financial crisis was caused not just by the use of 
“subprime” mortgages, but by the steady relaxation of standards 
required for “conventional” mortgages.237 
The SEC, in reliance on Dodd-Frank,238 has for the first time 
extended Regulation AB to cover privately placed asset-backed 
securities as well as those that are publicly registered.239  This small step 
forward, however, comes to grief, like so many provisions of Dodd-
Frank, in the discretion that it gives to those whom it purports to 
 
235. See Friedman & Friedman, supra note 152, at 33 (noting that after SEC agreed to 
let investment banks monitor their own risks in 2004, they assumed enormous new risks, with 
Bear Stearns taking on a leverage ratio of 33:1 by the time of its failure). 
236. Exchange Act § 15G(c)(1)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 2011)). 
237. See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text.  By contrast, the German 
Pfandbriefgesetz, see supra note 69 and accompanying text, requires strict supervision of 
financial institutions permitted to issue Pfandbriefe and of the collateral that backs the 
instruments.  Inter alia, issuing institutions retain all risk on the Pfandbriefe that they are 
permitted to issue, and if mortgages collateralizing a Pfandbrief become riskier than at the 
time the Pfandbrief was issued, independent trustees (“Treuhnder”) must replace them with 
instruments that adequately cover the obligations evidenced by the Pfandbrief.  See, e.g., 
Pfandbriefgesetz, PfandBG [Pfandbrief Act], 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL] at Teil I, §§ 1–
4, 12–16, 27–28.  Pfandbriefe survived the 2007–2009 crisis far better than their CMO cousins.  
Ironically, the only significant crisis affecting Pfandbriefe during the world financial crisis 
occurred late in 2008 not because of failure of mortgages collateralizing Pfandbriefe, but 
because a leading issuer, the Hypo Real Estate Pfandbrief Bank, became enmeshed in a crisis 
concerning its corporate parent, the Hypovereinsbank, because of the parent’s failed 
investment in the Depfa Bank in Ireland, requiring the German government to bail out the 
corporate parent.  See Kofner, supra note 69, at 23–25. 
238. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C.). 
239. See Disclosure for Asset-Backed Securities Required by Section 943 of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Dodd-Frank Act Release Nos. 33-
9175 & 34-63741, 76 Fed. Reg. 4489 (effective Mar. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
229, 232, 240 & 249). 
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regulate.  New Rule 15Ga-1240 requires securitizers—the assemblers of 
pools of assets used to collateralize asset-backed securities241—to report 
incidents in which they are required to repurchase or replace collateral 
that proves defective.242  The SEC itself, however, somewhat ruefully 
stated that this obligation will be triggered only if a securitizer subjects 
itself to a contractual obligation to repurchase or replace assets that 
prove defective, and that commentators on the proposing release had 
noted it was unlikely to have significant effects.243 
Dodd-Frank also makes an elaborate but, in the last analysis, limited 
attempt at protecting buyers of complex financial instruments such as 
benefit funds by imposing more controls on rating agencies and the use 
of their output than previous legislation.244  Most significantly, it requires 
the SEC, banking regulators, and other federal agencies, to end the 
required use of ratings for matters as varied as qualifying for short-form 
registration of securities, and quality of required capital for financial 
organizations ranging from broker-dealers to banks.245 
Furthermore, since Dodd-Frank accepts that ratings will continue to 
be widely used in evaluating the quality of securities, it attempts to 
 
240. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15Ga-1 (2011).  
241. See Exchange Act § 15G(a)(3).  A securitizer is either: “(A) an issuer of an asset-
backed security; or (B) a person who organizes and initiates an asset-backed securities 
transaction by selling or transferring assets, either directly or indirectly, including through an 
affiliate, to the issuer.”  Id. 
242. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15Ga-1 (2011). 
243. See Disclosure for Asset-Backed Securities, 76 Fed. Reg. at 4489–91. 
244. See Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9 (Supp. IV 2011). 
245. Dodd-Frank Act § 939A requires federal agencies, within a year after enactment of 
the statute, to review all use of ratings used in their regulations.  Id § 78o-7.  While this has in 
fact taken far longer than the time required, the SEC has already adopted extensive 
amendments to its rules and forms, effective September 2, 2012, which remove virtually all 
use of ratings in its rules and forms, such as the use of ratings to qualify for use of the 
simplified forms S-3 and F-3 for registering securities for public distribution.  See Security 
Ratings, Dodd-Frank Act Release Nos. 33-9245 & 34-64975, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,603, 46,607 
(effective Sept. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240 & 249).  
The changes also include the elimination of former 17 C.F.R. section 230.134(a)(17), which 
had provided a “safe harbor” for issuers to use credit ratings in communications not subject to 
the rules governing prospectuses.  Id. at 46,603, 46,612.  As the SEC noted in removing the 
“safe harbor,” the change will probably have little effect because issuers will still be able to 
use ratings in free writing prospectuses, and, as we will see, the new rules that are supposed to 
improve the accuracy of ratings leave almost no room for an investor to sue an issuer or rating 
agency based on an inaccurate rating.  See id.; see also infra notes 295–97 and accompanying 
text. 
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assure greater objectivity in credit ratings by requiring rating agencies, 
as a condition for registration with agencies such as the SEC, to create 
their own systems of internal controls to establish procedures and 
methodologies to produce consistent and accurate ratings.246  Dodd-
Frank requires the agencies to appoint compliance officers to assure that 
each agency, in formulating its ratings, is in compliance with its own 
policies, and requires the chief executive officer of each agency to attest 
to its compliance with these policies.247 
Additionally, Dodd-Frank requires rating agencies to disclose their 
methodologies, including mathematical models, data used to formulate 
the ratings, limitations on the reliability of the ratings, and information 
concerning the past performance of the ratings.248  These are to be 
provided, on standard forms to be developed by the agencies 
themselves, to users of the ratings.249  These forms are supposed to be 
“easy to use and helpful for users of credit ratings to understand the 
information contained in the report.”250 
All of this sound and fury signifies next to nothing, however, for a 
number of reasons.  Even if Dodd-Frank provides for rules imposed by 
a body other than the agencies themselves,251 and is enforceable by users 
of the ratings as well as the SEC, the reports it prescribes to accompany 
the ratings would not likely be materially helpful to unsophisticated 
users, for whom, as the experience of the last decade shows, the ratings 
themselves are surrogates for due diligence on the quality of complex 
securities.  In the assembly of collateral for CDOs, as previously noted, 
complexity led even sophisticated investment bankers to rely solely on 
ratings for evaluating the chances of default on the securities based on 
that collateral.252 
Even if users actually make use of the new reports required by 
 
246. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(3). 
247. See id. § 78o-7(c)(3) to 7(j). 
248. See id. 
249. See id. § 78o-7(s). 
250. Id. § 78o-7(s)(2)(a). 
251. Broker-dealers, for example, are regulated by independent organizations such as 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the New York Stock Exchange as 
well as the SEC.  See About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2012); infra note 257 and 
accompanying text.  
252. See supra notes 70–75, 97–98 and accompanying text. 
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Dodd-Frank, however, agencies face little deterrence against 
formulating rules that favor themselves at the expense of their 
customers, because (a) enforcement of the provisions is left exclusively 
to the already understaffed SEC,253 and (b) the SEC’s authority is merely 
to prescribe rules under which the agencies are to regulate themselves, 
and its power to sanction misbehavior by a rating agency is largely 
confined to suspension or disbarment if an agency fails to conform to its 
own rules.254 
Dodd-Frank and the regulations being drafted to implement it offer 
no remedy at all for the problems faced by benefit funds holding once 
highly rated complex financial instruments that are now worthless, 
sharply diminished in value, or currently impossible to value.255  
Furthermore, they do not address important issues concerning the 
prevention of a similar debacle in the future. 
Dodd-Frank, whatever its use going forward, does nothing to 
remove barriers to actions by parties other than federal agencies based 
on transactions already completed.256  It therefore does not aid benefit 
funds and their state sponsors in bringing actions for frauds committed 
before the financial crisis.  Moreover, it adds little to the enforcement 
powers of the SEC, other federal regulators, and self-regulating 
organizations such as FINRA in bringing such actions.257 
More basically, Dodd-Frank, as it currently stands, is immensely 
complex, running 2,300 pages.258  In attempting to deal with the 
multitude of problems that became manifest with the 2008 financial 
crisis, it incorporates provisions that deal with matters ranging from 
 
253. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(q)–(s); Levitt, supra note 33. 
254. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)–(d). 
255. See generally Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified 
in scattered sections of the U.S.C). 
256. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 270, 280 (1994) (noting that there 
is a strong presumption against retroactive application of a statute unless retroactivity is 
expressly stated by Congress).  A SEC administrative law judge, addressing an initial attempt 
by the SEC to apply Dodd-Frank, held that substantive provisions of Dodd-Frank do not 
apply retroactively.  See Lawton, Release No. 419, File No. 3-14162 (ALJ Apr. 29, 2011) 
(initial decision). 
257. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority is an independent corporation (the 
successor to the National Association of Securities Dealers), which, under the general 
supervision of the SEC, acts as a self-regulatory organization for securities brokers and 
dealers.  See Carrie Johnson, SEC Approves One Watchdog for Brokers Big and Small, 
WASH. POST, July 27, 2007, at D1.  
258. See Levitt, supra note 33. 
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consumer protection to the regulation of rating agencies.  Because of 
this attempt at being comprehensive, and the compromises that went 
into achieving its wide scope, it lacks the conciseness and consistent 
legislative architecture that have made legislation such as the Securities 
Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002259 effective tools for securities 
regulation,260 and often falls short of real effectiveness in matters of 
concern to this Article, such as regulation of the rating agencies.  Dodd-
Frank, and particularly the sections of its Title IX that apply to rating 
agencies, are so prolix, indirect, and lacking in force261 as to fit the Court 
of Claims’ characterization of the 1959 Life Insurance Company Income 
Tax Act as a “conspiracy in restraint of understanding.”262  Moreover, to 
an even greater degree than earlier securities law, Dodd-Frank depends 
upon interpretive regulations, which are being drafted—with 
considerable difficulty—by multiple administrative agencies, for its 
enforcement.263  It is also subject to ongoing hostility in Congress that 
could result in the revision or repeal of some of its provisions, and which 
could also deter administrative agencies from drafting interpretive 
regulations as forceful as regulations already in effect under older 
federal statutes concerning securities.264  Because of this, it adds little to 
the protection given to future buyers of complex securities by previously 
enacted statutes. 
Dodd-Frank, more than prior legislation, gives the appearance of 
attempting to deal with the problems associated with the credit rating 
agencies.265  It requires the SEC to establish within itself an Office of 
 
259. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (Supp. IV 2011).   
260. In a current compilation, the entire 1933 Act, including almost eighty years of 
amendments, runs approximately forty-seven pages.  HAZEN, supra note 47, at 1–47. 
261. See supra notes 258–60 and accompanying text 
262. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. U.S., 582 F.2d 579, 583 n.1 (Ct. Cl. 1978). 
263. The CFTC, for example, voted to delay its rulemaking for key portions of Dodd-
Frank (other than those that are self-executing) until at least the end of 2011, more than six 
months after the deadline in the Act.  See CFTC Proposes Six-Month Delay for Bulk of 
Dodd-Frank Swaps Rulemaking, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (June 15, 2011). 
264. See Levitt, supra note 33 (Congressional Republicans, as part of their general 
hostility to the securities laws, have deliberately underfunded the S.E.C.’s statutorily required 
efforts to promulgate regulations for enforcement of Dodd-Frank); see, e.g., T.W. Farnam, 
Payday Lenders Writing Bigger Checks to Candidates, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2012, at A13; 
Newt Gingrich, Opinion, Reagan Had the Recipe for Success. Let’s Follow It, WALL ST. J., 
December 29, 2011, at A15; Peter J. Wallison, Opinion, How Regulators Herded Banks into 
Trouble, WALL ST. J., December 3–4, 2011, at A17. 
265. See Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (Supp. IV 2011). 
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Credit Ratings to administer the rules that it authorizes the SEC to draft 
concerning credit rating agencies, and to “promote accuracy” in the 
ratings.266  It also contains some useful provisions for disclosure by rating 
agencies on their practices in formulating ratings.267  These provisions, 
however, lack real teeth. 
Dodd-Frank provides, somewhat deceptively, for regulatory agency 
input in supervising what is essentially a scheme of self-regulation by the 
credit rating agencies.  To do so, inter alia, it mandates the creation 
within the SEC of an Office of Credit Ratings.268  Substantively, 
however, though it anticipates that ratings will continue to be used, 
particularly in privately placed offerings, it approaches abuses by credit 
rating agencies obliquely rather than directly.269  Its immense complexity 
is a source of weakness rather than strength.  It is partly self-executing, 
and partly relies on studies to be made and regulations to be 
promulgated by eight different federal agencies—the Treasury, Federal 
Reserve, SEC,270 CFTC,271 FDIC,272 FHFA,273 NCUA,274 and the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, plus a new Bureau of Consumer 
Protection.275 
Worse yet, though it gives the SEC some authority over the credit 
rating agencies, an important point for the concerns of this Article,276 it 
 
266. Id. § 78o-7(p)(1)(A)(ii).  
267. See supra notes 225–33, 245–50 and accompanying text. 
268. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(p)(1).  
269. See supra notes 222–32, 253–54 and accompanying text. 
270. 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(2). 
271. Id. § 8302(a)(1).  
272. Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5391(d) (Supp. IV 2011). 
273. The Federal Housing Finance Administration, successor agency to the Office of 
Federal Housing Oversight and conservator for the formerly independent Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac following their insolvency.  See About FHFA, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, 
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=4 (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). 
274. The National Credit Union Administration is given authority by the Federal Credit 
Union Act, enacted by Congress in 1934.  Federal Credit Union Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. § 1751 
(2006). 
275. Dodd-Frank requires the SEC alone to establish 5 new offices, conduct more than 
20 studies, and draft more than 100 sets of rules.  See Oversight of Dodd-Frank 
Implementation: A Progress Report by the Regulators at the Half-Year Mark: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Aff., 112th Congress 1 (2011) (statement of Mary 
L. Schapiro, Chair, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission). 
276. See generally Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (Supp. IV 2011).  
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leaves in place Exchange Act section 15E(c)(2),277 inserted by the 
retrograde Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA),278 
which bars not only the SEC but any State from regulating the agencies’ 
procedures, methodologies, or the substance of credit ratings, except in 
indirect ways.279  While Dodd-Frank has elaborate provisions requiring 
rating agencies to establish procedures for formulating ratings, and 
requires that these procedures be documented and disclosed,280 it does 
not permit regulatory agencies to play a direct role in formulating the 
ratings that the agencies place upon securities.281  Moreover, it preserves 
the exclusive authority given to the SEC by CRARA to enforce 
provisions of the securities laws dealing with rating agencies, if the 
agencies materially fail to conform to the procedures for rating 
securities prescribed by Dodd-Frank and other litigation.282 
Dodd-Frank does allow a private right of action against rating 
agencies under extremely limited circumstances: where the complainant 
 
277. Id. § 78o-7(c)(2). 
278. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 15E(c)(2), 
120 Stat. 1332 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)). 
279. See Exchange Act § 15E(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2) (2006); Rules for Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64514, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 33,420, 33,429  (proposed June 8, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 & 249); 
see also, Mark Twain (“A lie is like a cat.  It never comes at you straight.”).  Mark Twain is 
one of my favorite writers, and I have read so much of his writing (and reminiscences by 
people who knew him) that I cannot pinpoint the specific sources of this quote, although I am 
confident of its accuracy.  In fairness, Twain was intensely fond of cats, something that could 
not be said of his feelings toward Congress.  See CONNIE ANN KIRK, MARK TWAIN: A 
BIOGRAPHY 117 (“Reader, suppose you were a member of Congress.  And suppose you were 
an idiot.  But I repeat myself.”). 
280. See Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2011); Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 33,421–22. 
281. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2).  While Dodd-Frank states that the SEC may prescribe 
factors that an NRSRO should take into consideration in establishing, maintaining, enforcing, 
and documenting, an effective internal control system, the SEC’s role is permissive rather 
than mandatory, and the primary responsibility is still placed with the rating agency itself.  See 
id. § 78o-7(c)(3)(A).  This sharply contrasts with the direct role played by the SEC in 
overseeing regulation of broker-dealers by independent agencies such as securities exchanges 
and FINRA.  See Exchange Act § 4, 6, 19.  The SEC, as of August 8, 2011, deferred such 
prescription indefinitely pending observation of actual formulation by the rating agencies of 
their own internal control structures, illustrating in part the futility of doing so, given the 
complexity of the task in proportion to SEC resources, and the ultimate self-regulatory 
authority allowed the agencies under Dodd-Frank.  See Rules for Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 33,420–22. 
282. See Exchange Act § 15E(c)(1) (preserving any action “by the Commission” under 
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws). 
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is injured by a rating that was prepared by an agency in knowing or 
recklessly disregarding its own procedures for formulating ratings, or of 
information used in rating a security.283  It is, however, even more 
restrictive than the PSLRA in establishing high barriers that pleadings 
in such actions must overcome to allow them to proceed to discovery, 
making the right almost meaningless.284  In the first place, the pleading 
barrier applies not just to class action plaintiffs, but to all plaintiffs, 
including public benefit funds.285  Secondly, it bars any action from 
proceeding as far as discovery unless the plaintiff’s pleadings establish 
“a strong inference” that the agency, in preparing the rating, failed to 
comply with its own procedures, or to obtain “reasonable verification” 
of factual elements of the rating from sources other than the issuer or 
underwriter “that the credit rating agency considered to be competent” 
concerning the security being rated.286  The near-complete discretion 
given agencies to choose the methods and facts they use to rate 
securities makes it difficult to envision circumstances under which a 
plaintiff could overcome the pleading barrier to state a claim. 
While Dodd-Frank requires federal agencies to remove formal 
 
283. New SEC Rule 17g-7 requires NRSROs to disclose, as part of the report 
accompanying their ratings of asset-backed securities, any representations, warranties, and 
enforcement mechanisms available to investors under the rating agencies’ own internal 
procedures, and how they differ from the representations, warranties, and enforcement 
mechanisms under similar securities—but since these are left almost entirely to the discretion 
of the agencies themselves, the rule is deceptively meaningless.  See Disclosure for Asset-
Backed Securities Required by Section 943 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Dodd-Frank Act Release Nos. 33-9175 & 34-63741, 76 Fed. Reg. 
4504 (effective Mar. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229, 232, 240 & 249). 
284. Dodd-Frank § 939G, at first glance, seems to give non-agency claimants stronger 
claims against NRSROs for misleading ratings by repealing 1933 Act Rule 436(g).  Dodd-
Frank Act § 939G.  This rule provided that when a rating was referred to in a registration 
statement for securities, the NRSRO that issued it would not be considered an expert 
participating in the registration process for purposes of liability under 1933 Act section 11.  
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g) (2012).  Dodd-Frank, in repealing Rule 436(g), established that 
NRSROs would not be considered experts for purposes of section 11 liability unless they file 
a written consent to the inclusion of the rating in the registration statement.  Dodd-Frank Act 
§ 929P.  This is likely to have little impact because (1) most of the securities this Article 
addresses are exempt from registering, and (2) the rating agencies have indicated they will 
not give the requisite consents.  See Gregory A. Fernicola et al., Dodd-Frank Act 
Rescinds Exemptions Under Rule 436(g), SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM 
LLP & AFFILIATES (July 23, 2010), http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51&item
ID=2172.   
285. See Exchange Act § 21D. 
286. Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2011).  
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requirements that ratings be used in evaluating the creditworthiness of 
securities, it leaves individual federal agencies to provide for substitutes 
by regulation.287  The SEC and other regulatory agencies have begun to 
comply with this directive by promulgating new rules to remove 
references to ratings by the NRSROs from their regulations,288 but they 
have not come up with adequate substitutes, nor is it clear that it is 
possible to do what the ratings purported to do—i.e., to predict 
performance by complex securities over more than a short period of 
time.289 
Moreover, Dodd-Frank and its regulatory progeny do little to 
protect investors such as benefit funds who rely on ratings for their 
investments.  Its treatment of the conflicts of interest created by the 
agencies’ payment by the issuers of securities they are rating is typical of 
its soft approach to hard problems.  Instead of taking as its model the 
stringent provisions created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in dealing with 
conflicts of interest by auditors,290 it merely provides for a paper-thin 
separation between the agency employees who sell their agencies’ 
 
287. The SEC, inter alia, has removed investment grade ratings as requirements for the 
registration of primary offerings of non-convertible, non-equity securities for cash on short 
forms S-3 and F-3 (as compared to the much longer forms S-1 and F-1 used for offering non-
qualifying securities), and substituted a requirement that the issuer have issued at least $1 
billion in non-convertible, non-equity securities registered under the 1933 Act over the prior 
three years, or meet certain other transaction history requirements.  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 
239.13 (2012); Security Ratings, Dodd-Frank Act Release Nos. 33-9245 & 34-64975, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 46,603, 46,606–10 (effective Sept. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 229, 230, 
232, 239, 240 & 249); SEC, Form F-3: Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 
1933, General Instructions, § I.B.2; SEC, Form S-3: Registration Statement Under the 
Securities Act of 1933, General Instructions, § I.B.2. 
288. See, e.g., Security Ratings, 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,603 (removing references to security 
ratings from rule and form requirements under the 1933 Act and the Exchange Act per 
Dodd-Frank § 939A); Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Market Risk, 77 Fed. Reg. 53,060, 
53,061–62 & n.9 (Aug. 30, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225 & 325) (a joint 
final rule removing references to ratings for evaluating creditworthiness per Dodd-Frank 
§ 939A). 
289. Many comments made to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on its 
proposed rules to replace ratings with complex economic models noted that most community 
and regional banks did not have systems and staff capable of performing analyses at the level 
of credit rating agencies—and the same is, if anything, more true of all but the most 
sophisticated benefit funds.  See Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 77 Fed. Reg. at 53,062–63. 
290. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 103, 208(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7213, 7233 (2006) 
(making it unlawful for a registered public accounting firm or any person associated therewith 
to prepare or issue an audit report concerning an issuer of securities if subject to a conflict of 
interest as defined in Exchange Act § 10A(g)). 
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services and those who actually rate securities.291  It takes little analytic 
skill to see that agency employees who formulate ratings are aware that 
their agencies are paid by the issuers of the securities they are rating.  
Thus, these agencies depend on good relations with the small circle of 
financial institutions that underwrite the securities for their revenues, 
whether or not they have direct contact with those who sell the agencies’ 
services.  It is this systemic conflict of interest, rather than the individual 
conflicts of interest of agency employees that Dodd-Frank seeks to 
control, which provided the incentive for the deceptively positive ratings 
issued for complex financial instruments such as CDOs by the rating 
agencies during the New Gilded Age.292 
Another Dodd-Frank provision that superficially appears to 
encourage agency objectivity in formulating ratings similarly falls short 
of real effectiveness.  This is the requirement that an agency, in 
formulating a rating, shall rely on information from a source that it 
considers reliable other than the security’s issuer or underwriter.293  This 
is deceptively meaningless because the source must be one that the 
rating agency itself considers credible—and by leaving the decision on 
credibility to the agency itself, renders virtually unenforceable a claim 
that the agency failed to rely on truly objective evidence.  The vaporous 
nature of the provision is highlighted by considering what third-party 
sources a rating agency could rely upon to provide such information—
given that the only parties likely to have the resources to perform the 
kind of “due diligence” to which the statute refers, in the context of 
examination by agencies of third-party data,294 are the small circle of 
financial institutions that share a mutual interest in assuring that 
 
291. See Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2011); Rules for 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, at 33,426. 
292. See Complaint at 11–19, Illinois v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. 12 CH-02535 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
Jan. 25, 2012); Michael Bologna, Illinois AG Accuses S&P of Fraud in Ratings of Structured 
Finance Securities, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 5, at 231 (Jan. 30, 2012) (Illinois sued 
S&P in state court under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and Uniform Deceptive Practices 
Act, claiming that, in the ratings it gave structured finance securities sold to state agencies, S 
& P systematically misrepresented its credit analysis of the securities as objective when it in 
fact ignored their true risks to secure business from the securities’ underwriters). 
293. Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(v) (Supp. IV 2011). 
294. Exchange Act § 15E(s)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (Supp. IV 2011).  The statute’s use of 
the term “due diligence” is itself deceptive in that it falsely implies that providers of such 
information will be subject to the kind of liability to which an underwriter would be subject 
under Securities Act section 11(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 77a, 77k(b) (2006), for failure to 
perform due diligence, when Dodd-Frank in fact does not impose such liability.   
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complex securities receive good ratings. 
Even the requirement that the SEC prescribe a short form on which 
rating agencies are to be required to provide ratings users with the 
assumptions and methodologies underlying the procedures used in 
formulating ratings, and the data used in preparing particular ratings,295 
may ironically prove counterproductive.  Given the complexity of the 
mathematical models used to formulate ratings, one can be sure that 
they will add little or nothing to the ability of fiduciaries for all but the 
largest benefit funds to understand what the ratings mean,296 and smaller 
fund fiduciaries are more likely to simply look at the rating itself, and 
erroneously take confidence from the analytical apparatus provided by 
the forms that the rating can be relied upon.297 
V.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
Two problems must be addressed in dealing with losses incurred by 
public benefit funds before the losses escalate into a new dimension of 
the financial crisis that could prove comparable to or even more severe 
than the failure or threatened failure of great private financial 
institutions.298  The first is to enable them to recover losses by rescinding 
transactions or recovering damages from financial institutions that led 
them down the primrose path to improvident investments.  The second 
is to put in place a framework of regulation that will make it more 
difficult for benefit funds to put themselves in this kind of financial 
jeopardy in the future. 
Recoveries of losses—both those already realized and those that are 
still latent—will require enforcement of statutes and regulations 
 
295. Exchange Act § 15E(s). 
296. Even the most sophisticated investors may be unable to overcome the high level of 
information asymmetry they suffer as against sellers of complex financial instruments.  See 
Arora et al., supra note 138 (noting that the use of derivatives in financial products increases 
information asymmetry between sellers and buyers so that even a buyer with substantial 
information and great computational power cannot adequately compute their value). 
297. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, I Disclose . . . Nothing, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 22, 2012, at SR1 
(noting that elaborate required disclosure is rarely read by its intended recipients, and instead 
tends to be used by its providers to show compliance with disclosure law and thereby avoid 
legal liability). 
298. As this Article has previously noted, the ripple effects of large-scale insolvencies of 
public benefit funds could lead to a national financial crisis on the order of the threatened 
failure of major private financial institutions in 2008.  See supra notes 15–18 and 
accompanying text. 
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designed for this purpose.  Given the comparatively small size of the 
SEC’s Enforcement Division,299 this enforcement will require actions by 
states and individual funds as well as federal agency actions under the 
securities laws.  This, in turn, will require clarifying regulations designed 
to encourage meritorious actions being brought by benefit funds under 
the federal securities laws, dispelling the penumbra of deterrence 
created by the PSLRA that has driven securities fraud actions into the 
uncertain and inconsistent forums provided by the state courts.  The 
regulations should also make it possible for benefit funds to maintain 
actions in the federal courts based on statutory provisions that have 
heretofore been the exclusive preserve of the SEC.  The fact that the 
benefit funds are sponsored by states, state instrumentalities, and 
organizations of state employees will be useful in drafting regulations 
that gain effectiveness by furthering collaboration between the SEC and 
state agencies. 
A.  Enforcement: Regulations in Aid of Benefit Funds for Pre-Crisis 
Investments 
The first concern in addressing the problems faced by benefit funds 
with respect to investments in complex instruments, which are now non-
performing and either worthless or at least unsalable is to recover losses 
incurred when their purchase of the instruments in question was based 
on material misrepresentations or omissions by their vendors.  There are 
good arguments for addressing such wrongs through action by the SEC.  
These include the special expertise of the SEC’s Enforcement Division; 
the fact that the SEC can make use of statutes such as the Advisers Act, 
which are not privately enforceable;300 and the fact that enforcement by 
the SEC would create more uniform national rules.  Unfortunately, as 
has been noted, the SEC lacks staffing and financial resources to address 
all but the most serious cases of securities fraud.301 
 
299. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
300. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195–97, 203 (1963) 
(noting that Advisers Act section 206(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6, imposes a fiduciary duty on 
investment advisers requiring them to disclose all material information to clients and 
prospective clients—including public benefit funds). 
301. See, e.g., supra note 36. 
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B.  Enforcement: Giving Statutes Regulatory Teeth 
The SEC has—unfortunately well after much of the damage was 
done—taken action against abuses by investment advisers who allegedly 
fattened themselves in violation of the Advisers Act during the period 
leading up to the financial crisis.302  It has brought actions against parties 
accused of violating the Act, and formed a new unit within the 
Enforcement Division to specialize in violations of the Act.303  
Nonetheless, the unit consists of a total of just sixty-five professionals—
enough to bring some high-profile cases but not nearly enough to deal 
with abuses during the prelude to the crisis, let alone the future.304 
Dodd-Frank, despite the weaknesses described above,305 suggests a 
viable approach, even though the legislation only takes some 
preliminary steps in that direction: The SEC can multiply the 
effectiveness of its professionals by working with the states.  Dodd-
Frank does this, inter alia, by amending section 203A of the Advisers 
Act to provide that investment advisers with less than $100 million 
under management must be registered with and examined by their home 
states, and barring advisers in this group from registering with the 
SEC.306  More significantly, the Advisers Act authorizes the SEC to 
provide training and other reasonable assistance to state authorities in 
connection with the regulation of investment advisers.307  These 
provisions, however, are limited by barring the states from bringing 
enforcement actions against larger advisers that are required to register 
with the SEC, except for “fraud, pricing, and reporting violations,” 
implying that state enforcement in these cases requires proof of scienter, 
a requirement to which the SEC is not subject.308 
This suggests that more systematic cooperation between the SEC 
and the states across the entire spectrum of securities regulation would 
provide an effective way to allocate scarce resources to protect state 
instrumentalities such as benefit funds.  A first step in establishing a 
 
302. See id. 
303. See id. 
304. See id. 
305. See supra notes 223–25, 263–73, 279–86 and accompanying text. 
306. See Dodd-Frank Act § 410, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a) (Supp. IV 2011); Advisers Act 
§ 203A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006). 
307. Advisers Act § 203A(d). 
308. See SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 643 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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closer working relationship between the SEC and the states would be to 
split off a new Office of State Coordination from the SEC’s present 
Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, which presently 
engages in the largely futile exercise of attempting to conduct liaison 
with Congress.309  The new office would amplify the effectiveness of the 
SEC staff by arranging for it to coordinate the drafting of regulations for 
the protection of state instrumentalities such as benefit plans, providing 
training in securities enforcement for state professionals, and 
coordinating enforcement actions on behalf of such agencies with state 
attorneys general and other legal officers.  Moreover, it would help state 
agencies by providing regular procedures to notify the SEC of the need 
for enforcement action, thereby helping to place the investigative 
powers of the SEC at their disposal, and enabling the state agencies to 
make use of enforcement powers reserved by current law to the SEC, 
such as those created by the Advisers Act310 and other federal statutes 
such as section 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act.311 
In addition to multiplying the effectiveness of SEC enforcement, this 
coordination strategy would also help to ensure uniformity in the 
creation and enforcement of antifraud regulations affecting state benefit 
funds, by centering them on common federal standards rather than 
relying on inconsistent state legislation and state court interpretations of 
such legislation.312  More effective enforcement, based on uniform 
 
309. See Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N 
(Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/olia.htm. 
310. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006) (imposing a 
fiduciary duty on investment advisers requiring them to disclose all material information to 
clients and prospective clients—including public benefit funds); SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194–97 (1963).  The SEC has made use of the Advisers 
Act to obtain settlements from dealers who fail to disclose risks in complex financial 
instruments—including conflicts of interests on the part of dealers who had taken short 
positions on the instruments they were selling—to clients.  See Credit Suisse Alt. Capital, 
LLC, SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 9268, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release 
No. 3302, at 13–14 (ALJ Oct. 19, 2011). 
311. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)–(3).  The SEC has found section 17(a)(2) and (3) to be 
effective weapons against misrepresentations in the issuance of securities because, unlike the 
more famous section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, based on § 10(b), they allow 
relief without requiring the agency to prove scienter—willful or reckless misrepresentations or 
omissions.  See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695–700 (1980). 
312. State enforcement actions based on securities violations rose by 51% from 2009 to 
2010 alone.  See State Enforcement of Securities Violations in 2010 Up 51 Percent over 
Previous Year, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 2228 (Oct. 31, 2011).  Lack of 
uniformity in the application of state law to actions based on alleged securities fraud is a 
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standards, will not only help benefit funds recover losses from prior 
investments, but should have a deterrent effect against future abuses. 
C.  Rethinking Exemption from Registration for Asset-Backed Securities 
One of the basic problems created by deregulation beginning in the 
1970s, which helped lead unsophisticated managers of state and local 
benefit funds down the primrose path to the purchase of asset-backed 
securities, is that securities may be privately placed with such funds—
exempt from registration with the SEC,313 and therefore, from the 
stringent disclosure and due diligence obligations imposed on 
participants in the issuance of securities by the Securities Act.314  The 
exemptions have been created both by the Securities Act itself315 and 
pursuant to SEC regulations based on the statute.316 
Rule 506 is the final part of the SEC’s Regulation D, the most 
important of several regulations exempting the sale of certain securities 
from the general requirement that new securities be registered with the 
SEC before they can be sold.317  The Regulation D exemptions, based on 
the less specific exemptions provided by Securities Act sections 3 and 
4,318 have a dual purpose: to relieve small and startup businesses from 
the considerable burden of registering their securities under the 
Securities Act, and to relieve the already overtaxed SEC staff from the 
need to review the offering materials for securities not intended for 
general distribution for registration.319  Like the other exemptions from 
registration, it was not intended to make serious inroads upon the Act’s 
primary purpose—to insure full and fair disclosure concerning new 
securities to protect unsophisticated investors from the kind of securities 
 
problem not only in cases involving public benefit funds but also for private class actions, the 
primary target of the PSLRA, which have been brought in state courts in increasing 
numbers—a trend that has accelerated since 2005.  See Study: More M&A Class Actions Filed 
in State Courts than in Federal Courts, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 25, at 1277 (June 
20, 2011) (abstract available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856695).  
313. See supra notes 179–80, 314–17, 322–23 and accompanying text. 
314. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). 
315. See id. § 77d(4). 
316. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(1), .506(a) (2012). 
317. See id. § 230.506. 
318. HAZEN, supra note 47, at 185. 
319. See infra notes 336–40 and accompanying text; see also  SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 
346 U.S. 119 (1953) (noting that exemptions apply where there is no practical need for 
protection of the 1933 Act or its benefits are too remote). 
12 - MENDALES FINAL PRINTER  12/28/2012  11:14 AM 
2012] FITTING AN OLD TIGER 301 
 
fraud which was discussed in ample detail by the Congress that enacted 
the Securities laws in the wake of the great stock market crash of 1929.320  
Rather, it was designed to facilitate the sale of securities by small and 
start-up businesses without requiring the substantial time and expense 
required for registration under the Securities Act.321 
Rule 506 differs from the other exemptive provisions of Regulation 
D (Rules 404 and 405) in that it allows the issuance of unregistered 
securities without regard to their aggregate offering price if all persons 
to whom they are sold are accredited investors, as defined in Rule 
501(a).322  It is here that the devil gets into the details: First, public 
benefit funds with assets of $5 million or more, who are currently 
considered accredited investors by Regulation D,323 are not necessarily 
more sophisticated than the general public in their ability to assess the 
risk of securities offered to them.  Andrew Kolotay, a financial advisor 
with a Ph.D. in mathematics, testified at an SEC hearing that most 
municipal decision makers did not have sufficient skills to evaluate even 
comparatively simple swap transactions, and were therefore, even in the 
absence of fraud by their vendors, frequently overcharged by swap 
advisers and dealers.324  
Moreover, including smaller benefit funds in the class of persons to 
whom securities can be offered without meeting the requirements for 
registration does not serve the chief purpose of the Securities Act’s 
intent in providing exemptions of this kind.  This is to allow investors in 
small and startup businesses—both the founders of such businesses and 
venture capitalists who are able to understand the risks of such 
investments and, unlike benefit funds, able to absorb them—the chance 
to invest in such businesses without incurring the substantial costs of 
registration.325 
Regardless of the exemption employed, smaller benefit funds suffer 
 
320. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
321. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES 
& MATERIALS 78–79, 332–33 (12th ed. 2012). 
322. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a). 
323. See id. § 230.501–.506. 
324. See SEC Hearing on the State of Municipal Securities Market, supra note 20, at 1–2, 
7.  On the other hand, large funds, such as CALPERS, have substantial expertise concerning 
complex securities, although even they are subject to pressures by beneficiaries and political 
officials to seek higher yields at the expense of safety.  See, e.g., Evans, supra note 4. 
325. See HAZEN, supra note 47, at 187–88, 202–07. 
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from several vulnerabilities in being allowed to purchase unregistered 
securities.  First, as noted above,326 their managers lack the sophistication 
to understand the risks of complex securities that are difficult even for 
experts to evaluate.  Generally, the only basis they have had for judging 
the quality of their investments has been ratings, which have proven 
unsatisfactory for reasons already explained,327 and whose deficiencies 
are not adequately addressed by Dodd-Frank and agency regulations 
based on it.328 
The exemption from registration also means that issuers and persons 
involved in the issuance of complex securities are not bound by the due 
diligence requirements of Securities Act section 11,329 nor are they 
subject to more than minimal disclosure requirements.330  Since they are 
not subject to the SEC’s Plain English Rules,331 the disclosure of risks in 
any security privately placed with them pursuant to the exemptions, 
even in the absence of deliberate fraud, can be hidden in obfuscatory 
language that can be puzzling even to specialists in securities law.  
Moreover, of particular concern to smaller funds, unregistered securities 
are less liquid than registered securities, even if they are later registered 
or are resold pursuant to one of the SEC’s exemptions permitting the 
resale of unregistered securities.332 
There are three possible ways to remedy this situation.333  The first 
would be to exclude benefit funds entirely from the class of investors to 
 
326. See id. 
327. See supra notes 113–30, 138–42 and accompanying text (analyzing the unreliability 
of ratings). 
328. See supra notes 251–97 and accompanying text (analyzing why Dodd-Frank and 
regulations based thereon are inadequate to assure that ratings will provide accurate 
assessments of the risks in complex financial instruments being rated). 
329. See Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2006). 
330. See id. § 77k(b)(3). 
331. Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370, 6370 (Feb. 6, 1998) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R pt. 228, 229, 230, 239, 274). 
332. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e.  Even if public funds qualify for a resale exemption such as that 
in 1933 Act § 4(1), which is less than clear under case law, see, e.g., SEC v. Guild Films Co., 
279 F.2d 485, 489–90 (2d Cir. 1960), they would still be illiquid for lack of a ready market. 
333. Dodd-Frank gives backhanded recognition to the problems inherent in offering 
exemptions to accredited investors by repealing the 1933 Securities Act  § 4(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77d(5), see Dodd-Frank § 944(a)(1), but that exemption, which applied solely to the offering 
of securities with aggregate values of less than $5 million to accredited investors, was far less 
significant than the exemption of securities without limitations on value established by Rule 
506. 
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whom securities may be sold without registration under the Securities 
Act.  This would require two changes: the definition of accredited 
investor in Rule 501(a)(1) would be amended by striking the language 
“any plan established and maintained by a state, its political 
subdivisions, or any agency or instrumentality of a state or its political 
subdivisions, for the benefit of its employees, if such plan has total assets 
in excess of $5,000,000.”334  To complete this exclusion, Congress would 
need to amend Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) to eliminate the accreditation of this 
category of purchaser, without regard to the value of its assets, from 
those purchasers to whom an offering could be made subject to the 
exemption. 
An alternative approach would be to permit only the largest, and 
presumably the best-advised and most sophisticated, funds, to take 
advantage of the exemption, while barring its use by smaller and less 
sophisticated funds.  This could be done, for example, by raising the 
lower limit for fund assets to $100 million, a level that would support the 
retention of bond counsel by the funds.  Doing this would further one of 
the original purposes of Rule 506—to reduce the number of SEC 
filings.335  This approach, however, would be less satisfactory than the 
first.  This is because experience has shown that even the most 
sophisticated funds, such as CALPERS and the Texas Teachers Fund, 
suffered losses from improvident investments in complex financial 
instruments.336  This is partly due to the opacity of disclosure private 
placement memoranda for securities not subject to registration, and 
perhaps more because even the largest funds are subject to political 
pressures and pressures from their beneficiaries to raise yields on their 
investments—possibly to unreasonably high levels—in order to reduce 
required contributions by state agencies and beneficiaries.337 
A third and simpler approach would be to design a special 
exemption for benefit funds, while barring the private placement of 
securities with them under Rule 506.  Under this approach, “well-known 
seasoned issuers”338 would be permitted to make private placements of 
 
334. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1) (2012). 
335. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
336. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
337. See supra notes 4–5, 23–24, 62–66 and accompanying text. 
338. “Well-known seasoned issuers” are defined by Rule 405 under 17 C.F.R. 
section 230.405, as large, experienced issuers with a worldwide market for their securities, 
which have a history of compliance with the securities laws. 
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conventional debt and equity securities with larger benefit funds,339 but 
would be required to make the same kind of Plain English disclosure of 
risks now required on registration statements under the Securities Act.340  
Plain English disclosure of risks in order of the degree of danger they 
pose to investors will provide significantly more information to potential 
purchasers than simple ratings.  This approach would be a substantial 
improvement over reliance on ratings in aiding potential purchasers to 
understand the risks posed by complex financial instruments, giving 
them more of the security provided by purchasing registered securities, 
while also serving the Regulation D purposes of facilitating capital 
formation and relieving the SEC of the burden of having to review an 
augmented number of registration statements. 
D.  Amplifying Disclosure: Borrowing from the FDA 
The credit-rating agencies have clearly proven themselves 
inadequate to give benefit funds adequate warning of unsuitable risks in 
the CDO market.  CRARA did not even attempt a meaningful reform 
of the agencies’ business model, in which they are paid by the issuers of 
the securities that they rate,341 and Dodd-Frank does not adequately deal 
with this problem.  While it would prove helpful to give the agencies a 
due diligence obligation in formulating their ratings that resembles that 
assumed by other participants in the issuance of securities,342 there are 
three obstacles that stand in the way of making such duties effective in 
protecting public benefit funds against unwise investments in 
unconventional securities: (1) many of these securities may be sold to 
benefit funds without registration under the Securities Act,343 a problem 
that would be addressed by the reform of Regulation 506 described 
 
339. While, as we have seen, size alone does not guarantee sophistication on the part of 
a benefit fund, a fund managing at least $500 million in assets is better able to afford the risks 
inherent in holding unregistered securities than the present, ludicrously low limit of $5 million 
in current Rule 506.  Of course, state legislatures and regulators would also be free to require 
that state-affiliated benefit funds hold only registered securities.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501. 
340. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
341. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1385–87; David Ellis, Rating the Rating Agencies, 
CNNMONEY (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.money.cnn.com/2009/04/14/news/companies/rating_
agencies/index.htm (critics asserted—before enactment of Dodd-Frank—that attempted 
reforms of the credit rating agencies had not fixed the industry). 
342. See Mendales, supra note 67, at 1412–13. 
343. See SEC, Form S-8: Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, 
General Instructions; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501–.506. 
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above; (2) present national politics indicate that it is not legislatively 
possible to amend the Securities Act so as to include credit rating 
agencies among the parties required to perform due diligence in the 
issue of new securities—a step that Dodd-Frank carefully avoids; and 
(3) the credit rating agencies’ pockets are not deep enough to make 
whole public benefit funds injured by cutting corners in the rating 
process. 
Realizing this, the SEC has, in its proposed rulemaking authority 
under Dodd-Frank, proposed to eliminate ratings by the agencies from 
the process of issuing asset-backed financial instruments wherever 
possible.344  Not only is this required by Dodd-Frank,345 but it makes 
sense as a matter of policy.  This is true both because instruments more 
complex than basic RMBS may not be susceptible to meaningful rating, 
even in the absence of the conflicts faced by rating agencies,346 and so the 
use of ratings, however formulated, may be inherently deceptive as to 
the risks inherent in a rated security.  Disposing with ratings, however, 
leaves open the question of how benefit funds, especially smaller and 
less sophisticated ones, are to deal with the problem of correlating yield 
with risk when offered new instruments with temptingly high yields.  As 
suggested above, a first step would be to amend Rule 506 to eliminate 
smaller and less sophisticated funds from eligibility for private 
placements, which would have the dual effect of making them eligible 
for relief for material misstatements and omissions in offering materials 
under the more relaxed standards of the Securities Act, and to give their 
investments the additional liquidity provided by SEC registration.347  
This leaves the problem of protecting larger funds, which despite their 
size have still been victimized by material misrepresentations and 
omissions in deliberately opaque offering memoranda.348 
The traditional approach of requiring full and fair disclosure under 
the 1933 and Exchange Acts suggests a promising approach to this 
 
344. See supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text. 
345. See supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text. 
346. This is because the complexity of the mathematical models used in formulating 
ratings may be chaotic in nature.  This would make any deviation from initial assumptions 
used in the rating process in the performance of the collateral and structure of a complex 
financial instrument lead to unpredictably large changes in the probability of eventual default.  
See Arora, et al., supra note 138, at 2. 
347. See supra notes 333–34 and accompanying text. 
348. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
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thicket of political and practical problems.  The sellers of derivative 
obligations to municipal entities would be required to follow the SEC’s 
Plain English rules, governing disclosure in prospectuses issued to 
investors since 1998,349 in describing how the securities worked and how 
the benefits derived by all entities concerned with their issuance.  This 
would include clearly drafted “Risk Factor” sections that would clearly 
identify risks in the order of their severity.350  This would make it easier 
for prospective buyers: (1) to identify conflicts of interest on the part of 
sellers of securities being offered; (2) to identify clear risks involved in 
the purchase of instruments being offered, while barring sellers from 
hiding major risks in a thicket of verbiage detailing minor risks; and as a 
result (3) to make more effective risk-benefit analyses connected with 
any purchase.  Moreover, the clarity of disclosure would make it easier 
to state causes of action under the securities laws in the event of 
material misstatements or omissions of material facts, since it would 
make it more clear that such deceptions were made with the element of 
scienter required for stating claims under Exchange Act section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.351 
Moreover, following disclosure practices required by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) for prescription drugs, the disclosure 
would be required to include risk models based on experience with 
similar collateral, or, in the case of complex securities, to include 
experience-based risk models for the instruments in the pool on which 
the securities were based.352  
A further useful borrowing from the FDA would be to require, in 
disclosure dealing with high risk structures and/or collateral, or with 
securities on which little or no experience-based data is available, that 
issuers place such disclosure within bold black borders—the equivalent 
of “black box” disclosure on prescription drugs.353  Risks of this kind 
would include concrete risks of sudden and complete or near-complete 
loss of value in a security, such as that imposed by the existence of a 
 
349. See generally Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370, 6370 (Feb. 6, 1998) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 228, 229, 230, 239, 274); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.420–.421 (plain 
language principles must be used to enhance the “readability” of a prospectus). 
350. This would track present Regulation S-K, Item 503(c), 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c), now 
required for securities registered under the 1933 Act. 
351. See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
352. Prescription Drug Advertising, 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(3)(iii) (2012). 
353. See id. § 201.57(a)(4). 
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“trigger” enabling a holder of a senior tranche to liquidate all the 
collateral underlying a security on occurrence of an event such as a 
downgrade by a credit rating agency.354  Securities would also be subject 
to this treatment if their complexity makes it reasonably impossible for a 
party other than the dealer selling them to evaluate their risks, including 
securities whose collateral includes tranches of other securities or 
derivative instruments.355 
Three desirable results would flow from black box disclosures.  First, 
it would enable state governments to enact legislation barring their 
benefit funds and those of their subsidiary entities from buying direct or 
indirect interests in “black boxed” securities—thereby protecting them 
from pressure by beneficiaries and politicians to seek yield beyond that 
compatible with a reasonable degree of safety.356  Second, it would force 
sellers of securities with such characteristics to disclose them in an 
unmistakable format or face liability.  Third, even in cases where state 
legislatures fail to act, it would focus the minds of unsophisticated 
benefit fund administrators on the danger of the instruments they were 
considering and the possibility of being personally subject to litigation 
based on breach of fiduciary duty. 
E.  Regulations with New Teeth: Working with Dodd-Frank and Making 
Better Use of Earlier Statutes to Protect Benefit Funds 
The SEC, the CFTC, and other federal agencies have begun the task 
imposed upon them by Dodd-Frank to propose regulations to prevent 
 
354. See Gibson, supra note 138, at 17. 
355. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.  The European Central Bank has 
gone beyond the traditional disclosure-oriented U.S. approach to securities regulation, with a 
new directive that it will accept asset-backed securities as collateral for its loans to banks of 
EU member states only if they are collateralized by single classes of assets that can be 
documented at the level of individual loans in their underlying asset pools.  See Press Release, 
European Central Bank, ECB Announces Implementation of Loan-Level Data Reporting  
Requirements for Asset-Backed Securities (July 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120706.en.html; ECB to Require More 
Data on ABS Starting This Year, REUTERS (July 6, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012
/07/06/ecb-assetbackedsecurities-idUSL6E8I691G20120706. 
356. This would be in line with the approach adopted by the European Central Bank, 
supra note 355 and accompanying text, except that it would go somewhat farther by simply 
barring state instrumentalities from investing in securities lacking readily assessable risk.  
Considerations of federalism require this kind of provision to be made at the state level.  See 
supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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new financial crises of the kind with which we are still dealing.357  
Proposed regulations based on Dodd-Frank have been slow in emerging 
from the agencies, however.  Because the statute they interpret is 
huge,358 combines an unrealistically large number of objectives,359 and is 
riddled with compromises that rob it of directness and force, it does not 
provide the firm foundation for regulations provided by more 
straightforward statutes such as the Securities Act and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.360 
The deficiencies of the new statute and regulations based on it to 
date are both substantive and procedural.  Substantively, the statute 
does require the removal of ratings from substantially all regulations 
promulgated by federal agencies, from the SEC to the Comptroller of 
the Currency.361  However, it does not establish a satisfactory substitute 
for the rating process.  Moreover, since there is no uniform substitute 
for the rating process established by the statute and regulations, it is 
inevitable that ratings will continue to be used, particularly in private 
placements, by buyers of securities in evaluating their quality—and 
here, Dodd-Frank not only leaves in place the prohibition of substantive 
regulation of the rating process by the SEC established by CRARA, but 
retains CRARA’s requirement that in formulating regulations to 
enforce the limited rules that Dodd-Frank establishes for the rating 
agencies, regulatory bodies such as the SEC are to construe the limits on 
 
357. Rules of Registration of Municipal Advisers, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 34-
63576, 76 Fed. Reg. 824, 824 (proposed Jan. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 
249). 
358. See Levitt, supra note 33. 
359. Dodd-Frank also deals with other complex issues such as the coordination of the 
federal agencies jointly charged with its administration, see Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 712 
(Supp. IV 2011), the regulation of previously unregulated financial entities such as hedge 
funds, see id. § 619, problems associated with preventing financial institutions from becoming 
“too big to fail,” see Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, pmbl, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), the 
receivership of large financial institutions, see 12 U.S.C. § 5382, the public clearing of 
heretofore unregulated financial instruments such as swaps, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 8301–25 
(encapsalating Tittle VII Subtitle A—Regulation of Over-the-Counter Swaps Markets—of 
the Dodd-Frank Act), and the protection of consumers from abuses by financial institutions.  
See pmbl., 124 Stat. at 1376. 
360. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 7201 (2006)) (officially known as The Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act).  
361. See Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (Supp. IV 2011). 
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the rating agencies narrowly.362 
Procedurally, Dodd-Frank and the regulations based on it are far 
less helpful than they appear at first sight for vindicating the rights of 
benefit funds sold paper of dubious quality because Dodd-Frank looks 
chiefly toward agency enforcement, and in fact raises a bar against 
private actions based on misleading ratings even higher than that set by 
the PSLRA for more traditional actions for securities fraud.363  As we 
have seen, even with the combined forces of federal regulatory agencies, 
staffing has not been sufficient to prevent abuses under prior law.  In 
view of this, and since Congress has blocked the funding provisions built 
into Dodd-Frank to expand agency staffing,364 it is unreasonable to 
expect the agencies to be fully effective in enforcing the vastly more 
complex regulatory structure that Dodd-Frank, as implemented by 
regulations still being drafted, will create.  This Article therefore 
proposes a strategy to deploy existing resources in a way that will more 
fully take advantage not only of the vast, nebulous, and untried 
regulatory structure created by Dodd-Frank, but of older, more clearly 
drafted statutes such as Securities Act securities 17(a)(2) and (3),365 and 
the Advisers Act,366 which heretofore have been enforced exclusively by 
the SEC.367 
The key to more efficient deployment of existing resources will be to 
pool and make the best allocation of scarce federal and state securities 
regulatory capability by establishing, pursuant to regulations to be 
promulgated by the SEC, a framework under which states, whose 
 
362. Exchange Act § 15E(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2) (2006). 
363. See supra notes 283–85 and accompanying text. 
364. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
365. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)–(3); supra note 311 and accompanying text.  These 
provisions authorize the SEC to order the disgorgement of funds obtained by 
misrepresentation or omission of material facts, without the need to prove scienter as under 
Rule 10b-5.  See Complaint at 3, SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc., 11-Civ.-4206 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); 
SEC Litigation Release No. 22008, June 21, 2011 (noting that J.P. Morgan agreed to pay 
$153.6 million to settle charges that it failed to disclose to investors, including a not-for-profit 
beneficial organization, that securities pooled in a CDO sold to the investors were in part 
selected by a hedge fund that held a short position in those securities). 
366. See Complaint at 7, SEC v. Steffelin (S.D.N.Y. filed June 21, 2011) (No. 11-Civ.-
4204) (noting that employees of investment advisory firm that marketed CDO to investors 
and failed to disclose that securities underlying CDO that it marketed were subject to a short 
position held by a large hedge fund charged with violations of Advisers Act, with relief sought 
including disgorgement of profits, injunctive relief, and civil penalties). 
367. See 15 USC § 78a. 
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subdivisions and agencies are the primary sponsors of the benefit funds 
discussed by this Article, can work directly with federal agencies 
(including not only the SEC but also the CFTC, the FDIC, and the 
Comptroller of the Currency) in enforcing laws and regulations that 
heretofore have been the exclusive preserve of the federal agencies.  
The SEC, which has the greatest experience in bringing enforcement 
actions among the federal agencies involved in this sphere, should take 
the lead by creating within itself an Office of State Coordination.  This 
office would serve as a regular channel for state instrumentalities to the 
SEC to request help by its Enforcement Division in obtaining relief for 
violations of the federal securities laws.  It would also provide for 
standardization of SEC training for state professionals in bringing their 
own securities law enforcement actions (now being done on an ad hoc 
basis), and would locate and assign SEC personnel to lead teams of state 
professionals in bringing enforcement actions under statutes such as the 
Advisers Act, which may now be enforced only by the SEC.368 
F.  Indirect Consequences of Effective Regulation 
Effective regulatory reform will have healthy consequences going 
beyond its direct purposes.  It will, as with Dodd-Frank’s provisions 
dealing with “too big to fail” financial institutions,369 help to stabilize the 
nation’s overall financial system.  For the benefit funds who are its 
primary beneficiaries, it will not only reduce the level of risk to 
beneficiaries, but, by making risk easier to estimate, it will encourage 
measures to establish fund contributions at realistic levels. 
Legally, it should reduce the penumbra of unnecessary deterrence of 
meritorious actions by benefit funds under the federal securities laws by 
the PSLRA, and encourage bringing them in federal court.370  This is 
desirable not only because the federal courts are generally more 
experienced in dealing with securities law cases than the state courts, but 
it will produce greater national uniformity in dealing with securities law 
issues,371 and in turn make it easier for transactional lawyers in and out 
of the U.S. to effectively advise their clients on minimizing the risk of 
 
368. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) 
(Investment Advisers Act § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6, creates no private cause of action). 
369. See Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5323 (Supp. IV 2011).  
370. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
371. See supra notes 308–12 and accompanying text. 
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litigation resulting from securities transactions. 
It will also have broader effects on world financial markets.  By 
providing more effective deterrence against deceptive promises of safety 
combined with unrealistically high yield, it will reduce the volume of 
exotic securities with dubious value, and thereby help to stabilize 
financial markets generally.  Moreover, by reducing the availability of 
exemptions from registration to securities and purchasers to those 
actually intended by the drafters of the Securities Act, and compelling 
more extensive and clearer disclosure even for securities exempt from 
registration, it will increase the transparency of the securities markets 
for financial institutions both in the U.S. and overseas.  This 
transparency will help both to prevent new freeze-ups of world credit 
markets such as occurred in 2008, and encourage investment in 
productive activity as opposed to mere trading. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The potential losses faced by government-sponsored benefit funds 
from improvident investments in unconventional securities is a major 
matter of concern not only for the funds’ beneficiaries, but for the credit 
of the states they serve, and ultimately the U.S. economy as a whole.  
This Article has focused on threading through the present politics of 
deadlock to (1) aiding recovery of losses by benefit funds on pre-crisis 
investments made based on misrepresentations by the peddlers of 
unconventional securities; (2) multiplying the effectiveness of relatively 
understaffed regulators by facilitating federal-state collaboration both 
on recoveries from past fraud and prevention of future fraud; and (3) 
doing so by regulations that avoid reliance on the dysfunctional political 
process that now obstructs meaningful legislation. 
The most effective mechanism for recovering losses on pre-crisis 
benefit fund investments, particularly in view of the Supreme Court’s 
increasingly restrictive views of private rights of action under the federal 
securities laws,372 will be to make the best use of scarce SEC resources by 
coordinating SEC enforcement efforts with state agencies under 
 
372. In Janus Capital Grp. v. First Derivative Traders, the majority implied that it 
continued to accept implied rights of action by non-agency persons under the securities laws 
based only on its reluctance to entirely demolish the precedents establishing such rights, and 
that it would therefore construe such rights as narrowly as possible.  See 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 
(2011); supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
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provisions of the federal securities laws that would not be available to 
the states acting without SEC authority.  The establishment of an Office 
of State Coordination within the SEC will help to train state and 
municipal lawyers in making effective use of the securities laws against 
abuses already committed, help the SEC pick targets worthy of its direct 
attention, draw the SEC’s attention to abuses best addressed by statutes 
enforceable only by SEC action, such as the Investment Advisers Act, 
and thereby not only redress past securities violations but enhance 
general deterrence against such conduct in the future. 
Going forward, the protection of benefit funds from improvident 
investment will require the amendment of SEC rules.  First, smaller and 
less sophisticated funds should be taken out of the accredited investor 
category that has enabled them to buy unregistered securities.373  This 
will benefit them in at least three ways: (1) it will improve disclosure to 
them of the risks of their investments; (2) it will provide them with 
greater liquidity for their investments; and (3) in the event that 
disclosure documents concerning their investments include materially 
misleading statements and omissions, particularly concerning risk, it will 
enable them to obtain redress through the less stringent standards of 
Securities Act section 11,374 rather than forcing them through the higher 
hurdles required for actions based on Exchange Act section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5. 
Secondly, the SEC should make its Plain English rules mandatory 
for all securities-related disclosure, including disclosure in private 
placement memoranda.  These rules will require risks to be stated 
 
373. As noted above, supra notes 209–12, 238–43 and accompanying text, Dodd-Frank 
section 943 and new SEC rules and forms based thereon purport to apply to unregistered as 
well as registered asset-backed securities for the first time—but their coverage is limited to 
requiring securitizers who have assumed contractual duties to replace or repurchase defective 
assets in pools collateralizing securities to report when they have done so, a requirement that 
even the SEC does not expect to have very much impact.  See Disclosure for Asset-Backed 
Securities Required by Section 943 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Dodd-Frank Act Release Nos. 33-9175 & 34-63741, 76 Fed. Reg. 4489, 4489–
51 (effective Mar. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229, 232, 240 & 249). 
374. Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) to (b) (2006).  Section 11(a) and (b) impose 
liability on issuers, underwriters, and other persons participating in the issuance of securities 
for inaccuracies in registration statement, and, by requiring them to establish their due 
diligence as a defense, requires plaintiffs to merely prove negligence to recover, rather than 
the higher burden of proving scienter (knowing or reckless misrepresentation) required to 
establish liability in private actions under Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Supra notes 
308, 329 and accompanying text. 
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plainly and in order of their importance by issuers and underwriters, 
who are better situated to be aware of them than even sophisticated 
investors receiving disclosure documents,375 and will, by forcing issuers to 
focus on risks, reduce their ability to engage in fraudulent practices such 
as “lulling” investors by concealing risks in a mass of optimistic-
sounding verbiage.376  There is no utility in permitting issuers to conceal 
risks known to them in thickets of obscure language, and even in the 
real paradigm for allowing the placement of unregistered securities—
enabling investors to buy into new businesses not yet ready to go 
public—clear disclosure of risk should promote rather than discourage 
investment.377 
For public benefit funds, the Plain English rules will, by forcing 
issuers to clearly describe inherent risks in order of severity, furnish a 
more realistic way to judge investment quality than ratings.  The rules 
will help deter deception by making it more difficult to hide material 
misstatements and omissions behind obfuscatory language,378 and easier 
for plaintiffs to prove that material deceptions and omissions were made 
with the scienter required for buyers to bring successful actions under 
the federal securities laws.  They will also make it easier for fiduciaries 
running large funds that remain accredited to resist political pressures 
and pressures from beneficiaries to put higher paying but risky privately 
placed securities in their portfolios.  This would be further amplified by 
requiring issuers to “black box” major risks, which would enable state 
legislatures to simply bar state instrumentalities from investing in 
instruments carrying such “black box” warnings. 
 
 
375. See generally Arora et al., supra note 138.  
376. “Lulling” consists of communications to investors to lead them to believe that their 
investments are secure, contrary to the knowledge of the communicators, and thus constitutes 
an intentional violation of the federal securities laws that can give rise to criminal as well as 
civil liability.  See U.S. v. Love, 535 F.2d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1976).  
377. See Michael Schroeder, Caveat Entrepreneur: The Latest Stock Scams Prey on New, 
Nonpublic Outfits, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 14, 1996, at 114–15 (noting that inadequate 
disclosure in privately placed securities puts investors at special risk of securities fraud); 
Whalen, supra note 19, at 8–10 (information asymmetry gives dealers in OTC securities a 
substantial advantage over buyers and rating agencies). 
378. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1976); Exchange Act 
§ 10(b); 17 C.F.R. § 204.105-b (2011). 
